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ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
I. Introduction
A. Free Trade and Fair Dealing in International Business
Transactions
The driving force behind the New Global Economy is
international competitiveness. As multinational enterprises
struggle to meet the challenges of today's freewheeling, 24-hour-
a-day, truly global marketplace, governments and businessmen
alike are re-examining and re-evaluating virtually every aspect of
international business practices. The drive to achieve and sustain
international competitiveness is producing important and dramatic
changes in the way international business is done.
One clear trend is the movement toward open markets and free
trade. A consensus is emerging among economists that free trade
benefits all who practice it, even though there remain many who
do not. Free trade, its advocates relentlessly drum home, is best
under all circumstances.2  Another recent trend--slower to
develop, but potentially as powerful--concerns the darker,
sometimes seamy underside of international business. As
competition intensifies and margins shrink, governments and
businessmen around the world are paying closer attention to the
risks, costs, and consequences of bribery, graft, and other forms of
corruption in international business.
It is increasingly clear that these two trends are interrelated and
interdependent. A truly open, free, and competitive world
marketplace requires a trading system characterized by honesty,
transparency, and fair dealing. As Robert S. Leiken has testified,
"reducing bribery, smuggling and kickbacks is part and parcel of
free trade; anti-corruption is part and parcel of democracy.
Today's decisive battles for free trade, development and
democracy may well be fought on the terrain of corrupt
practices."3
2 "The discipline's most devoutly held belief is that free trade is a good thing."
Economics Focus: How to Beggar Your Neighbor, ECONOMIST, Feb. 3, 1996, at 68.
3 Hearings of the Senate Caucus on Int'l Narcotics Control & the Senate Finance
Comm. Subcomm. on Int'l Crime, 104th Cong. (1996), available in LEXIS, Nexis
1997]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
Yet there remains a general unease. Manifestly, some
competitors who do not play by the rules still gain a competitive
advantage over those who do. In the United States, measures such
as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act4 are regarded by many as
well-meaning attempts to force American business to comply with
unrealistic ethical ideals, which the rest of the world ignores. Fair
dealing, like free trade, looks like a trap for the unwary or the
naive. But as this Article will discuss, pressures are at work in the
New Global Economy to establish and enforce higher standards of
honesty in international commerce.
As "survival of the fittest" capitalism spreads, transparency
will be increasingly demanded This is a dynamic which is
clearly observable in international relations today.6  As a
consequence, private businessmen can be expected to not only
conform, but also to move beyond mere compliance as the
economic benefits of honesty and, transparency increasingly
manifest themselves. ' This process is already well underway In
large part due to pressure from governments and multinational
organizations, corruption is slowly being squeezed out of the
global economy. Ultimately, corruption will be contained
Library, Cumws File (testimony of Robert S. Leiken, President of New Moment, a non-
profit organization which works on issues of international democracy) [hereinafter
Hearings on Int'l Crime].
4 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), 78dd-l, 78dd-2, 78ff (1988) (originally enacted as Pub. L.
No 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977), and amended by Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, §§ 5001-5003, 102 Stat. 1107, 1415-25).
5 See infra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
6 See G. Pascal Zachary, Anticorruption Drive Starts to Show Results, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 27, 1997, at Al. "Now; freer markets and more democracy have made business
bribery less acceptable." Id.
7 See id.
8 See Deepak Gopinath, Rules of the Game, INFRASTRUCTURE FIN., Oct. 1996, at
49, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File. "[I]ncreasing democratization and
market transparency are bringing [bribery] into the media glare. Even at the highest
levels, officials are now finding that prosecutors are examining what goes on under the
table as well as on top. ' Id. According to Frank Vogl, Vice-Chair of Transparency
International, "[w]ith the opening of more and more countries to multiparty politics,
coupled with greater press freedom and efforts by public prosecutors, many incidents of
corruption have come to the fore." Id.; see also Barbara Ettorre, Why Overseas Bribery
Won't Last, MGMT. REv., June 1994, at 20. For further discussion of the changing
attitudes regarding corruption in international business, see infra notes 257-60 and
accompanying text.
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because, quite simply, it is bad for business.
B. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
The movement in the United States towards a more transparent
global economy began with the enactment of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (FCPA) in 1977.9 Generally, the FCPA prohibits
payments by Americans to foreign officials in order to obtain or
retain business.'0 The FCPA today is recognized worldwide as the
9 For a general survey of the FCPA see DON ZARIN, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (1995); RALPH H. FOLSOM & MICHAEL W. GORDON,
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 311-38 (1995) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS]. '
The FCPA (and its 1988 amendments) amended the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78ll (1982), making it unlawful for any issuer of securities
registered under Section 12 of that Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78/; or an issuer required to file
reports according to Section 15(d) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(d), to make (with
some exceptions) payments to foreign officials in order to obtain or retain business. See
15 U.S.C. § 78dd- 1 (a); see also INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, supra, at 317.
There is an FCPA exception for so-called "grease payments" that are intended to
facilitate "routine government action." 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(b). "Routine government
action" is defined at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(f)(3), 78dd-2(h)(4), as:
1. obtaining permits, licenses or other official documents which are part of
the process of qualifying to do business in the country;
2. processing such papers as visas and work orders;
3. providing police protection, mail pick-ups and delivery, or scheduling
inspections which are associated with the performance of a contract or
related to transit of goods across country, and;
4. providing telephone service, power and water supply, loading and
unloading cargo, or protecting perishables from deteriorating.
Id. A fifth class encompasses "actions of a similar nature." Id.; see also INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, supra at 325.
10 INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, supra note 9, at 316. The FCPA
prohibits direct payments to foreign officials, or payments by third persons, when these
payments are used to influence any act or decision of the foreign official in his official
capacity. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a)(l)(A)(i); see also INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS, supra note 9, at 316. The FCPA also prohibits direct payments used to
induce a foreign official to act or refrain from acting in violation of the official's duty.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd- 1 (a)(l)(A)(ii); see also INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS,
supra note 9, at 316-17. Finally, the FCPA prohibits payments used to induce a foreign
official to use his or her influence with a foreign government or agency to influence its
decision making. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a)(l)(B); see also INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS, supra note 9, at 317.
The Act also requires accurate financial record keeping in order to enable
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most aggressive effort by any government to enforce international
standards of honesty in international business transactions.
Indeed, the FCPA remains unique; it is the only such domestic law
with extraterritorial reach prohibiting one nation's nationals from
engaging in bribery abroad.I"
In simplest terms, the FCPA was originally an effort by the
U.S. government to regulate the behavior of American enterprises
engaged in international business. 12 It was designed to send the
message that illicit payments abroad by Americans would no
longer be tolerated. Enacted in the wake of Watergate, the FCPA
embodied a growing sentiment in the United States that bribery,
even when committed abroad, is ethically unacceptable,
economically anti-competitive, and simply bad business. 3
Violations of the FCPA are punished severely. 14 Bribery under
the FCPA is a criminal offense carrying a maximum fine of $3
million per violation. 5 Violations by individuals carry maximum
fines of $250,000 or up to twice the amount of the gross gain or
loss that any person derived from the offense. One found guilty of
detection of illicit payments. INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, supra note 9, at
317; see also DONALD R. CRUVER, COMPLYING WITH THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES
ACT 11-15 (1994) (discussing the accounting standards required by the FCPA).
" See ZARIN, supra note 9, at 1-2. Swedish law "arguably deal[s] with the bribery
of foreign officials, although there has not been any prosecution of foreign bribery by
Swedish authorities." Id. at 1-3 n.8. See Swedish Penal Code, SFS 1977: 103 (entered
into force Jan. 1, 1978), cited in ZARIN, supra note 9, at 1-3 n.8. Similarly, "[t]he
British Government has also indicated that the 1906 Prevention of Corruption Act may
apply to a British Company which bribes a foreign official." Id. Nonetheless, the
United States "[stands] nearly alone in responding to the general condemnation of
payments to foreign officials by [having] enact[ed] legislation." INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, supra note 9, at 314.
12 See Glenn A. Pitman & James P. Sanford, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Revisited: Attempting to Regulate 'Ethical Bribes' in Global Business, INT'L. J.
PURCHASING & MATERIALS MGMT., Summer 1994, at 15. See INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS, supra note 9, at 312-13 for a discussion of the political goals and
legislative history of the FCPA.
13 See ZARIN, supra note 9, at 1-1, 1-2, 1-3.
14 See INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, supra note 9, at 326 (noting that
"[t]he severity of penalties for violations of the FCPA mandate close consideration of its
provisions by all persons doing business abroad"). The Securities and Exchange
Commission monitors compliance with the record keeping provisions of the FCPA
while the Department of Justice enforces the provisions against foreign bribery. See id.
15 See U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(g)(l)A, 78ff(c)(1)(A).
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a violation may also face imprisonment for not more than five
years. "
Since the FCPA came into effect, Americans operating abroad
have realized that the risks are too great and the sanctions too
severe to skirt the rules. For example, in 1995 Lockheed Martin
Corporation admitted to conspiring to violate the FCPA.17  The
case involved bribery of an Egyptian member of Parliament18 to
secure the purchase of three C-130 military cargo planes.' 9 The
company was fined approximately $25 million2' and one executive
was sentenced to 18 months in jail.2 Similarly, General Electric's
out-of-court settlement for its involvement in an affair involving
the Israeli military provided for an $8 million dollar fine and $52
million in restitution.22 The Baxter International Health Care
group, after pleading guilty to federal charges of bribing Arab
officials, paid $6.5 million in civil and criminal fines.23 Thereafter,
the New York City Comptroller called for a ban on Baxter's
bidding on any New York City health-care contracts.24
The FCPA has been roundly criticized since its inception.25
Many American businessmen complain about the hassle, red tape,
16 See id.
17 See Wendy C. Schmidt & Jonny J. Frank, FCPA Demands Due Diligence in
Global Dealings, NAT. L.J., Mar. 3, 1997, at B16.
18 See Gopinath, supra note 8, at 49; Arthur F. Mathews & Ronald C. Machen,
1994 and Early 1995 Securities Enforcement Review: Part III, INSIGHTS, Sept. 1995, at
15.
19 See Schmidt & Frank, supra note 17, at B16.
20 Lockheed incurred a criminal fine of $21.8 million and entered a civil settlement
of $3 million. See United States v. Lockheed, 1:94-CR-226-01 (N.D. Ga., plea
agreement filed Jan. 30, 1995); United States v. Nassar, 1:94-CR-226-MH5 (N.D. Ga.,
plea agreement entered July 31, 1995); see also Schmidt & Frank, supra note 17, at B16.
21 Schmidt & Frank, supra note 17, at B16.
22 See P. K. Semler, U.S. Firms Shift Strategy, Push for Anti-Corruption Laws
Abroad, J. COM., Apr. 18, 1994.
23 See id.
24 See id.
25 See, e.g., John L. Graham, Don't Dilute Law Curbing Bribery Overseas by
American Companies, L.A. TIMES, June 15, 1986, at 3. For a discussion of the reaction
to the FCPA and criticisms of it see ZARIN, supra note 9, at 1-3, 1-4.
19971
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arid costs of compliance with the FCPA.26 American firms, some
argue, operate at a competitive disadvantage to European or Asian
firms unburdened by such Pollyanna concerns.27 If U.S. firms
were only freed from these bonds of legislative morality, this
argument goes, they would be able to compete more effectively for
international business.
These criticisms have never been convincing. While bribery
and corruption unfortunately remain a fact of life in international
business, there is no compelling evidence that the FCPA itself puts
American firms generally at a competitive disadvantage to their
European or Asian counterparts." The evidence that exists to
show a negative FCPA impact is mostly anecdotal. There are
certainly instances where business has been lost to corruption,
such as in the case of Environmental Tectonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick
26 For a discussion of the economic harm argument and the reasons it is
unpersuasive, see Daniel Pines, Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to Include
A Private Right ofAction, 82 CALIF. L. REv. 185, 207 n. 142 (1994). See INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, supra note 9, at 314 (pointing out that the proposed and then
enacted law was "criticized severely by many in the business community"). One report
by the Heritage Foundation found measures such as the FCPA reduced exports by
adding to production costs. Peter G. Germanis, Getting Rid of U.S. Barriers to U.S.
Exports, HERITAGE FOUNDATION REPORTS, Apr. 22, 1982, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Arcnews File. The report criticized, "overlapping or contradictory regulations.
• . [and the] paperwork and administrative costs associated with attaining given
standards." Id.
27 "Executives involved in international business call [the FCPA] 'stupid
legislation'--and worse." Graham, supra note 25, at 3; see also Pitman & Sanford,
supra note 12, at 15; ZARIN, supra note 9, at 1-3, 1-4. "Foreign competitors, not subject
to an FCPA-type law, are therefore less constrained than U.S. companies and can more
easily resort to illicit payments to foreign officials to obtain business. This places U.S.
companies at a competitive disadvantage vis-i-vis their foreign competitors." ZARIN,
supra note 9, at 1-3, 1-4.
28 See INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, supra note 9, at 314-15. "[T]here
is little significant evidence that the law has harmed United States business to any
substantial degree." Id.; see RICHARD T. DE GEORGE, COMPETING WITH INTEGRITY IN
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 105 (1993). As Raymond V. Gilmartin, Chairman, President
and CEO of Becton Dickinson and Company and board chairman of the Ethics Resource
Center put it, "I've never heard a manager say, 'We can't do business because we're
limited by the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.' We are not at a competitive disadvantage
at all." Ettorre, supra note 8, at 20; see also Franklin Gevurtz, Commercial Bribery and
the Sherman Act: The Case for Per Se Illegality, 42 U. MIAMI L. REv. 365-67 (1987).
29 See Gevurtz, supra note 28, at 365-67.
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& Co.3" Yet a GAO survey indicated that less than 1% of the 250
American corporations surveyed claimed any loss of business due
to the FCPA.' More recent studies show that U.S. exports have
not declined due to the law, nor has American business been made
less competitive." All indicators, in fact, are to the contrary.
The only surveys which support FCPA critics primarily reflect
businesses' anxieties and perceptions about the Act, not actual
business expenses. A House Report on an early draft of the Act
noted that most illicit payments by American corporations were
made not to compete with foreign corporations, but rather to gain
an edge over other American competitors.34 In sum, as one
commentator has stated,. "the claim that U.S. companies have lost
exports because of the FCPA is often made and never
substantiated.
35
This is not to deny that corruption exists or that business is lost
because of it. Corruption, like tariffs and other restraints, is a
burden on global markets. But just as the world community is
moving towards more free trade, it is also making more aggressive
efforts worldwide to uncover, attack, and punish economic
corruption. 6
30 847 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1988); see discussion infra notes 83-85, 93-100 and
accompanying text.
31 See DE GEORGE, supra note 28, at 105.
32 See id.
33 See Pines, supra note 26, at 185, 208.
These surveys, however, are not determinative of whether the FCPA actually
affected U.S. businesses. For example, a closer examination of the GAO study
reveals that the results were not quite as dire as critics of the FCPA would like
to purport. The 30% figure, representing the percentage of respondents who
believe that the Act led to a decrease in American business, includes the almost
20% of respondents who found that the Act had effectuated only '[s]omewhat
of a decrease in business'- as opposed to a 'moderate' or 'great decrease in
business.' Furthermore, 67% of those surveyed reported that the Act had little
or no effect on business.
Id. at 208-09 (citations omitted).
34 See H.R. REP. No. 640 at 5 (1977), quoted in United States v. Castle, 925 F.2d
831, 834 (5th Cir. 1991).
35 Pines, supra note 26, at 209 (citations omitted).
36 See Hearings on lnt'l Crime, supra note 3; Kimberley Music, Proposal Being
Readied to Help Firms Compete Overseas, OIL DAILY, Sept. 10, 1996, at 1, available in
1997]
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More importantly, criticisms such as these have become
irrelevant. The end of the Cold War has propelled economic
issues such as trade and corruption to the forefront of American
foreign policy. The FCPA can now be regarded as a harbinger of
things to come, rather than an aberration of the 1 970s. Yet while
the FCPA remains the most visible, it is by no means the only
weapon used to combat bribery in international business
transactions. Numerous other federal37 and state38 laws, as well as
private causes of action,39 are being used to fight corruption in
international business transactions.
Part II of this article will describe how corruption has emerged
as an issue of international economic foreign policy since the end
of the Cold War.40  Part III will discuss non-FCPA measures to
combat bribery in international business transactions, as well as
recent U.S. initiatives to combat corruption. Part IV will describe
and assess similar efforts by foreign nations and multinational
institutions. 42  These government initiatives have not gone
unnoticed by the private sector. Part V highlights the response by
the private sector in the international business community.43
Finally, Part VI resurrects the classical link between markets and
morals, and applies this insight to the New Global Economy.
44
II. Corruption as an Issue of International Economic Foreign
Policy
A. Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War World
The FCPA was originally conceived in a Cold War context,
when U.S. foreign policy was dominated by issues of peace,
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File (quoting one Clinton Administration official as
saying, "the tide is turning" in the global fight against corruntion).
37 See infra notes 75-152 and accompanying text.
38 See infra notes 200-15 and accompanying text.
39 See infra notes 153-99 and accompanying text.
40 See infra notes 45-74 and accompanying text.
41 See infra notes 75-239 and accompanying text.
42 See infra notes 240-333 and accompanying text.
43 See infra notes 334-55 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 356-62 and accompanying text.
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defense, and national security.45 Nation-states were the primary
actors, and the instruments of foreign policy were in their hands.
Armies and navies, their troops and equipment, embassies and
ambassadors, as well as strategic alliances and foreign aid were all
nation-state pawns in a chess match between two dominant and
mutually exclusive ideologies. The importance of containment
relegated "soft" foreign policy concerns such as economics, trade,
and investment to the back burner.
All that has changed. Liberal democracy and free markets now
stand alone as the preferred social model; and even where' they
have not yet been implemented, they remain aspirational. 4 Most
observers agree, there is no preferable or even feasible alternative.
We are all Jeffersonians, all Smithians now.47 "[T]he growth of
liberal democracy, together with its companion, economic
liberalism, has been the most remarkable macropolitical
phenomenon of the last four hundred years. 48 In 1790 there were
three nations that could be described by contemporary standards as
"liberal democracies. '4 9  In 1900 there were thirteen; in 1960,
thirty-six; but by 1990, there were sixty-one.5 ° According to
Freedom House, 114 countries had a political system that could be
described as democratic in 1995."
The end of the Cold War, the collapse of Communism, the
shift to Western-style democracy and market economies have all
moved issues of international economic policy to the forefront of
U.S. foreign policy concerns. Early in his Presidency, Bill
45 See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992).
46 See id. at 48-50.
41 See id.
48 Id. at 48.
49 Id.
10 See id.
5t See Mois6s Naim & Norman Gall, Corruption and Democracy, BRAUDEL
PAPERS (Ferdinand Braudel Institute of World Economics, Brazil) Nov. 13, 1996, at 4.
52 See Hearings on Int'l Crime, supra note 3. "For the first time in six decades
there is no international threat of tyranny. U.S. security and prosperity are threatened
more immediately today by the unconventional dangers of international crime cartels,
arms and drug smuggling, transnational bribery, the spread of pestilent viruses--all of
which entail corrupt government officials." Id. As former Secretary of State Warren
Christopher put it, "[t]he Clinton Administration defines American security not only in
1997] 399
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Clinton stated that national security encompassed "economic
security."53 Increasingly, the business of American foreign policy
is business.4 Accordingly, the FCPA is getting a new lease on
life: the values and principles manifested by the Act are plainly
emerging as important issues of U.S. economic foreign policy.
As issues of international economic policy increasingly
dominate foreign policy, two important things have occurred.
First, the importance of the nation-state as a primary actor has
decreased." Nations and governmental agencies have had to
readjust their roles and their prerogatives." Size and power are
political or military terms, but also in terms of economic strength." America's
Partnership with the European Community, DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, June 21, 1993, at 447
(remarks of Warren Christopher). The Clinton Administration moved away from the
concept of a collective security system based solely on security concerns to one based on
other, non-military issues, such as economic and humanitarian aid. Building a
Collective Security System, DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, May 10, 1993, at 332 (remarks of
Madelaine Albright). "[C]ollective security has broadened in theory and practice to
encompass far more than military remedies to keep the peace." Id. at 333-34. Collective
security now takes the form of preventive diplomacy, humanitarian relief, state-building
operations, protecting human rights, and engaging Russia. See id.
13 Charles Lane, National Insecurity: Why Spy?, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 27, 1995, at
10.
54 See id. To that end, the Clinton Administration ordered American embassies to
promote exports and investment aggressively. See id. Similarly, the Central
Intelligence Agency has begun investigations into economic research and investigations,
where once it was involved only in "harder" issues such as defense and terrorism. Id.;
see also Greg Steinmetz & Robert S. Greenberger, Open for Business: US. Embassies
Give American Companies More Help Overseas, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 1997, at Al.
"U.S. diplomats used to spend most of their time digging into bigger matters, such as
possible threats to national security and trying to avert wars. Now, they spend about as
much time going to economic conferences, lobbying on trade issues, and opening
shopping malls." Id.
55 See KENICHI OHMAE, THE END OF THE NATION STATE (1995). "The nation state
has become an unnatural, even dysfunctional, unit for organizing human activity and
managing economic endeavor in a borderless world." Kenichi Ohmae, The Rise of the
Region State, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Spring 1993, at 78. For a slightly different view see
The Nation-state is Dead. Long Live the Nation-state, ECONOMIST, Dec. 23, 1995, at 15
[hereinafter The Nation-state is Dead]. "Neither the age of superstates, nor the end of all
states, is about to happen." Id.
56 See Ohmae, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 55, at 82-86; see also Jessica T.
Mathews, Power Shift, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Jan./Feb. 1997, at 50. "The end of the Cold
War has brought .... a novel redistribution of power among states, markets, and civil
society." Id. In the New Global Economy the nation-state is "sharing powers-
including political, social, and security roles at the core of security-with businesses,
with international organizations, and with a multitude of citizens groups ...." Id. The
400 [Vol. 22
ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
measured less in kilotons or throw weight, and more in speed,
technology, and efficiency." One observer has noted that "[t]he
bigger the world economy, the more powerful its smallest
players."58 Another believes "[r]egion-states have ... become the
primary units of economic activity .... The primary linkages of
these natural economic zones are not to their 'host' countries but
to the global economy."'5 9
Second, the instrumentalities shaping and controlling foreign
affairs are more and more in private hands, to an astounding
degree independent of and technologically emancipated from
direct governmental supervision, regulation, and competence.
For example, various supra-national financial forces ejected
Britain from the Exchange Rate Mechanism in September 1992,1
caused the bond market to crash in some industrial nations in
1994,6 and nearly destroyed the Mexican economy. 63 Nations are
not powerless, but they are subject to supra-national economic
forces as never before in history. 64  As Democratic Presidential
advisor James Carville put it, "I used to think that if there was
reincarnation, I wanted to come back as the president or the pope.
author believes that, "the steady concentration of power in the hands of states that began
in 1648 with the Peace of Westphalia is over, at least for a while." Id.
57 See The Nation-state is Dead, supra note 55, at 15.
58 JOHN NAISBITr, GLOBAL PARADOX: THE BIGGER THE WORLD ECONOMY, THE
MORE POWERFUL ITS SMALLEST PLAYERS 12 (1994).
59 Kenichi Ohmae, New World Order: The Rise of the Region-State, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 16, 1994, at 12; see Ohmae, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 55, at 78.
60 See Who's in the Driving Seat?, ECONOMIST, Oct. 7, 1995, at 3.
61 On September 16, 1992 financial markets forced the British pound to lower
levels than were allowed under the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). See
Richard W. Stevenson, New Reasons for Doubt About Monetary Union, N.Y. TIMES,
July 31, 1993, at 47. Despite attempts to strengthen sterling by an unprecedented two-
stage rise in base rates from 10 to 15 percent, the British Government was forced to
suspend the pound from the ERM. See id.; see also Correction Appended, ECONOMIST,
Sept. 26, 1992, at 16.
62 In the fall of 1994 rising interest rates helped trigger a crash of the bond market
in the United States. Wall Street: Red Braces, Pink Slips, ECONOMIST, Feb. 18, 1995, at
73. See, Who's In the Driving Seat?, supra note 60, at 3.
63 See Under the Volcano, ECONOMIST, Jan. 7, 1995 at 14; Suddenly There's a
Hole, ECONOMIST, Jan. 14, 1995, at 63; Rescuing the Sombrero, ECONOMIST, Jan. 21
1995, at 18.
64 See Who's in the Driving Seat?, supra note 60, at 3.
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But now I want to be the bond market: you can intimidate
everybody."65 Another observer notes, "[g]overnments know they
have lost control of the national economy."66  Even where the
nation-state retains an appropriate role in policy-making,
implementation of such policies depends less upon national or
global institutions and more upon private enterprises and
individual entrepreneurs.67
Nation-states do not trade with one another; enterprises do.
This means that governments, which by definition are responsible
for providing the "public goods, 68 that the market needs, have a
great interest in the values, norms, and standards of conduct and
behavior of international investors, traders, financiers, and
executives. More global attention to business ethics in the world
market should be expected.
B. "Public Goods" and the Honest Market
Global competition continues to become more intense and
unforgiving. As a result, the masters of efficiency among the
world's competitors will come to demand honesty in business.
Fair dealing rewards precisely what competitors do best and what
world markets favor most--the production of better quality
products at lower cost.
Companies will come to demand an honest marketplace in the
basket of "public goods" essential to the efficient operation of the
global economy. Economists define "public goods" as those
things which the market needs and demands, but which can best be
produced (or in some cases will only be produced) by
governmental actions or institutions, or by international agencies
acting with the consent and encouragement of nation-states.69 In
65 Id.
66 R. C. Longworth, Boom, Bust or What?, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 30, 1994.
67 See Who's In the Driving Seat?, supra note 60, at 3.
68 See infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
69 See STEVEN E. RHODES, THE ECONOMIST'S VIEW OF THE WORLD 66 (1990).
According to Rhodes, a public good, or "collective consumption good," is one, "where
consumption is nonrival (i.e., a number of people may simultaneously consume the same
good) and where it is either prohibitively expensive or impossible to confine the benefits
of the good to selected individuals." Id. To maximize economic efficiency, public
goods should be provided only if consumers are collectively willing to pay more than
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this sense, an honest market will prove as important to world
commerce as an interstate highway system, air traffic controllers,
or a reliable and politically independent judiciary which
recognizes and enforces private property rights." One economist
correctly points out that "[c]apitalism cannot work in a society
dominated by theft. It needs a legal system guaranteeing the
existence of private property and the enforcement of contracts.""
Corruption is fundamentally incompatible with international
competitiveness; it distorts proper functioning of the market and
drains confidence in a worldwide economic system dependent on
tough, but fair competition. 2  According to one democracy
advocate, "[t]ransnational bribery represents a hazard to free trade
and investment, a threat to democracy and development, and, in
collusion with international crime, a danger to national security
and public health and safety. No foreign policy issue affects
Americans more, yet few get less attention from the foreign policy
community."73
This attitude is changing. The FCPA, originally an expression
the opportunity cost of provision. See id. The externalities of corruption in the
international system, however, more than justify the provision of a transparent market.
See infra notes 271-83 and accompanying text, referring to the economic and political
costs of corruption in the international system.
70 The "public good" of a transparent market can be contrasted with the "public
bads" caused by corruption. Hearings on Int'l Crime, supra note 3. "The 'public bads'
which corruption creates include not only bad policy and bad and unsafe buildings,
bridges, roads, water, air, etc., but also bad attitudes. Corruption produces negligent,
cynical government and inept officials who owe their jobs to nepotism and patronage."
Id. See infra notes 275-83 and accompanying text for discussion of the economic costs
of bribery.
71 LESTER C. TRUROW, THE FuTuRE OF CAPITALISM 274 (1996). Thurow points out
that
it is possible to protect private property rights with locks, burglar alarms, and
privately hired guards. But it is costly to do so. It is far more efficient to
inculcate social values that lead people not to steal. With such values private
property is protected at zero cost. The aggressive individual is socially tamed
rather than physically constrained. Societies don't function very well unless
most of their members voluntarily behave most of the time.
Id. at 275.
72 See infra notes 275-83 and accompanying text.
73 Hearings on Int'l Crime, supra note 3 (testimony of Robert S. Leiken, President
of New Moment, a non-profit organization which works on issues of international
democracy).
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of Yankee idealism, has been reborn and revitalized as an
instrument of new economic pragmatism.74 The FCPA today is
more than an anti-bribery statute; it is also an expression of the
world market's new stand against corruption.
III. The Global Fight Against Corruption--U.S. Efforts at
Compliance
The United States has historically been in the forefront of the
global fight against corruption. The power of American leadership
in issues of foreign policy should not be underestimated. Even if
the FCPA did not exist, the U.S. stand against corruption would be
clear. Numerous other legal mechanisms are in place or under
development to fight corruption in international business.
A. Federal Civil and Criminal Statutes
1. Mail and Wire Fraud
Prior to enactment of the FCPA in 1977, federal mail and wire
fraud statutes7 were used to prosecute American corporations
engaged in bribing foreign officials. 76  Both statutes have been
broadly interpreted to encompass any scheme or artifice that
involves deception contrary to public policy 77 or deprives the
public of "the intangible right of honest services."W1
Application of the mail and wire fraud statutes is not limited,
71 See id. "[T]he solution to trans-national bribery lies not in a futile attempt to
repeal the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act but in universalizing it and supporting reforms
in emerging countries." Id. (emphasis added).
75 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (mail fraud) (1988); 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (wire fraud) (1988),
76 See ZARIN, supra note 9, at 11-6.
77 See id.; United States v. Mandel, 541 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 961 (1980)..
78 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (1988) ("[T]he term 'scheme or artifice to defraud' includes a
scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services."). This
expansive definition was enacted in the statute despite an earlier Supreme Court ruling
limiting liability for such conduct to that involving the deprivation of money or
property. See ZARIN, supra note 9, at 11-6 (citing McNally v. United States, 483 U.S.
350 (1987)). Accordingly, "[a] scheme to defraud which involves bribery would come
within the purview of the statute." See ZARIN, supra note 9, at 11-6; United States v.
Brown, 540 F.2d 364 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388 (2d. Cir.
1976).
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in theory, to bribery of American government officials;79 rather,
coverage may extend to cases where bribery of foreign officials
deprives the American public of the intangible right of honest
services."0 More speculative is the idea that bribery of foreign
officials could deprive foreign nations of the right to honesty and
faithful service." In fact, no case holds that bribery abroad so
deprives the foreign nation.82 The Third Circuit in Environmental
Tectonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., 3 however, noted in dicta that
"[b]y illegally influencing the decisions of [Nigerian] public
officials,"' 4 the defendants had created two classes of victims: the
citizens of Nigeria, who suffered from a corrupt civil service, and
the American taxpayers, because "bribery of foreign officials by
American businessmen diminishes [U.S.] stature and influence
abroad." 5 Similarly, the grand jury considered but did not charge
mail fraud in United States v. Crawford,"6 a case where defendants
Crawford Enterprises and its CEO allegedly obtained multi-
million dollar purchases of gas compression equipment from a
Mexican corporation through bribery. 7 As a practical matter, mail
and wire fraud charges are generally brought only as an additional
count to charges of conspiracy to violate the FCPA They remain
useful, however, because they can serve as a basis for federal
racketeering charges. 9
79 See ZARIN, supra note 9, at 11-7.
80 See, e.g., supra notes 76-78.
81 See ZARIN, supra note 9, at 11-7.
82 See id.
83 847 F.2d. 1052, 1063 (3d Cir. 1988). Environmental Tectonics featured
plaintiffs use of RICO charges against a competitor engaged in bribery of foreign
officials. See infra notes 93-100 and accompanying text.
84 Environmental Tectonics, 847 F.2d at 1063.
85 Id. at 1063-64. For the indictment and disposition of the case, see 2 FOREIGN
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT REPORTER 696.53-696.71 (July 31, 1985).
86 No. H82224 (S.D. Tex., Oct. 2, 1982) (indictment), reprinted in 2 FOREIGN
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT REPORTER 696.53 (July 31, 1985). For a discussion of the
Crawford case see ZARIN, supra note 9, at 11-7 n.29.
87 See United States v. Crawford, 643 F. Supp. 370, 372 (S.D. Tex. 1986)
(describing the procedural history of the case).
88 See ZARIN, supra note 9, at 11-7.
89 See id.; see also infra notes 90-106 and accompanying text.
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2. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act
A second method of attacking illicit payments is through the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) Act.9"
RICO civil liability confers standing on "[a]ny person injured in
his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962."9'
More precisely, to acquire standing under RICO a plaintiff must
prove three elements: (1) a violation of section 1962; (2) injury to
business or property; and (3) causation of the injury by the
violation.92
Recently, RICO charges were successfully used to combat
international bribery in Environmental Tectonics Corp., Int'l v. W.
S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc.93  Plaintiff Environmental Tectonics
Corporation International (ETC) sued W. S. Kirkpatrick &
Company for antitrust and RICO violations.94 Both ETC and
Kirkpatrick were New Jersey corporations in the business of
selling equipment and parts to foreign countries. 95 In order to
secure contracts with the Nigerian government, Kirkpatrick's
Chairman and CEO permitted Kirkpatrick to pay out
"commissions" totaling over $1.7 million to various Nigerian
officials.96 After its lower bid on the same project was rejected,
ETC investigated, discovered what had transpired, and brought a
number of complaints against Kirkpatrick, its CEO, and its two
90 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988).
91 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
92 See O'Malley v. O'Neill, 887 F.2d 1557, 1561 (11 th Cir. 1989).
93 847 F.2d 1052, 1063 (3d Cir. 1988), aff'd sub nom, W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v.
Environmental Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400 (1990). The case is well known for the
U.S. Supreme Court ruling on the Act of State doctrine, but of equal interest are the
Third Circuit's earlier remarks on the case's RICO implications. See Environmental
Tectonics, 847 F.2d at 1063-64. After the Supreme Court's ruling on appeal, "[RICO]
may be an effective method for private suits involving violations of the FCPA, unless
RICO is amended to diminish its scope." INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS,
supra note 9, at 332.
91 See Environmental Tectonics, 847 F.2d at 1054. Plaintiff sued under a New
Jersey Anti-Racketeering statute, RICO, and Section 13(c) of the Robinson-Patman
Antitrust Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1996); see Environmental Tectonics, 847 F.2d
at 1054.
95 See id. at 1055.
96 Id.
[Vol. 22
1997] ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 407
parent corporations-one in Delaware and the other in
Luxembourg.97
The CEO and his company were both convicted under the
FCPA and fined substantially.98 Additionally, the court held that
allegations of bribes paid to foreign government officials in order
to obtain military contracts are sufficient to allege a pattern of
racketeering under RICO.99 The court found that a European
conglomerate, two American corporations, and a consultant with
Nigerian connections had "developed a sophisticated and
outwardly legal front for the payments," accounting for "numerous
violations of federal law."1 '
RICO charges have been used in other contexts as well. For
example, bribes to influence officials of the Jamaica Tourist Board
to retain the Young & Rubicam advertising agency led to several
RICO indictments in United States v. Young & Rubicam, Inc.10 1
97 See id. at 1056.
98 See id.
99 See id. at 1063. The court stated,
One could view these payments as a single illegal payment separated into
installments, and thus as a one-time affair, rather than as 'criminal activity that,
because of its organization, duration, and objectives poses, or during its
existence posed, a threat of a series of injuries over a significant period of time.'
But, to focus only on the series of payments-i.e., one bribe divided into four
parts-is to ignore the complexity of Kirkpatrick's scheme.
Id. (citations omitted).
100 Id. For a RICO violation, there must be a "pattern" of racketeering activity. Id.
In Environmental Tectonics, in order to determine whether such a pattern existed, the
Third Circuit looked to a combination of factors: "the number of unlawful acts, the
length of time over which the acts were committed, the similarity of the acts, the number
of victims, the number of perpetrators, and the character of the unlawful activity." Id.
The court found that ETC's factual allegations in its amended complaint more than
satisfied the pattern requirement. Id.
101 741 F. Supp. 334, 337 (D.Conn. 1990). In Young & Rubicam, a series of related
payments over a substantial period of time sufficed to create a "racket," despite
defendant's claim that there was only a single bribe to obtain a single contract, and that
the kickbacks paid to Jamaican officials were not installments on that bribe, but separate
payments in amounts related to advertising. Id. at 340-41. On February 9, 1990 Young
& Rubicam pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to bribe foreign officials.
Abrahams v. Young & Rubicam, 793 F. Supp. 404, 405 n. I (D. Conn. 1992). In return,
all bribery and RICO charges were dropped. See id.
In the related case of Abrahams v. Young & Rubicam, 793 F. Supp. 404 (D.
Conn. 1992), aff'd in part and rev 'd in part, remanded, question certified, 79 F.3d 234
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RICO charges have also been used to snare foreign violators
engaging in fraud in the United States. 0 2 In another case, British
defendants transacting business in the District of Columbia-
sending and receiving mail, faxes, and phone calls-were held
subject to personal jurisdiction under state long-arm provisions"'03
in a RICO suit over attempts to defraud the United States
government in connection with the sale and maintenance of
helicopters.' 4 Application of the Travel Act0 5 in the context of
international bribery has also been used as a basis for RICO
claims.16
3. Arms Export Control and False Statements Acts
Further restrictions against illicit payments apply to specific
businesses, such as contractors or suppliers obtaining U.S.
government financing or those making defense-related sales under
(2d Cir. 1996), the former Minister of Tourism & Information of Jamaica, a defendant in
the original case, sued for negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction
of emotional distress, libel, and slander. See 793 F. Supp. at 405. The indicted bribee
failed to establish RICO claims against the bribers. See id. at 407. Eventually, all
counts, except for individual defamation charges against one Moore, were dropped. See
id. The Second Circuit again disallowed plaintiff's RICO cause of action. See id. at
240.
102 See Dooley v. United Technologies Corp., 803 F. Supp. 428, 434 (D.D.C.
1992).
103 See id. at 435-36. RICO provides for nation-wide service of process, but not for
service of process in foreign countries. See id. at 433. In Dooley, service of process was
authorized under the District of Columbia's long-arm statute. See id. at 436.
104 See id. at 428-30. There is, however, a "government contacts exception" which
"precludes the assertion of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident whose only contacts
with the District of Columbia are for purposes of dealing with a federal agency or
Congress." Id. at 434; see also Cellutech, Inc. v. Centennial Cellular Corp., 871 F.
Supp. 46, 50 (D.D.C. 1994) (stating that FCC and SEC filings standing alone are
insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction due to the government contacts exception).
101 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1994) (prohibiting interstate and foreign travel in aid of
racketeering enterprises).
106 "The Travel Act prohibits travel in interstate or foreign commerce or the use of
the mail or any facility in interstate or foreign commerce, with intent to promote,
manage, establish, or carry on any 'unlawful activity."' ZARIN, supra note 9, at 11-7.
"Unlawful activity" was originally targeted at organized crime. See id. Since then, a
violation of the FCPA can provide a basis for violation of the Travel Act. See id. at 11-
8.
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the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) 7  Military "[c]ontractors
and suppliers providing goods or services pursuant to [AECA]
financing must provide a certification to the Defense Security
Assistance Agency,.. . which is responsible for administering the
loans."'0 8  The certification requires an attestation that
organizations receiving financing under the act are not engaging in
any illicit payments abroad. 0 9  Enterprises so engaged face
criminal sanctions under the False Statements Act, 110 which
prohibits knowing or willful falsification, concealment, or cover-
up of a material fact to a U.S. government agency.'l1
These federal registration and certification requirements have
been used to prosecute Americans engaged in illicit payments
abroad. In U.S. v. Dale,' defendant Ashton challenged her
convictions for fraud in connection with four forms submitted to
government agencies,' where she and other corporate officers of
Automated Data Management, Inc. (ADM) were engaged in illegal
107 International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. §§
2778-2779 (1988); see CONTRACTOR CERTIFICATION AND AGREEMENT WITH DEFENSE
SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCY, DOD SECURITY ASSISTANCE MANAGEMENT MANUAL,
DOD DIRECTIVE, 5108.38-M, ch. 9; see also THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACT COMPLIANCE
HANDBOOK, ch. 20 (Federal Publications, Inc., 2d ed. 1991); ZARIN, supra note 9, at 11-
10 n.43 "The Foreign Military Sales Program provides loans to foreign governments to
finance the purchase of defense articles or defense services of U.S. origin." Id. at 11-9
through 11-10.
10 ZARIN, supra note 9, at 11-10.
109 See id. The certification provides:
1. No bribes, rebates, gifts, kickbacks or gratuities have been or will be
offered to or given to offices, officials, or employees of the foreign
government to secure the contract or favorable treatment; and
2. The contract price includes only specified commission or other contingent
fees paid only to bona fide employees or agents which neither expect nor
propose to exert improper influences to solicit or obtain the contract.
Id. (citing CONTRACTOR CERTIFICATION AND AGREEMENT WITH DEFENSE SECURITY
ASSISTANCE AGENCY, DOD SECURITY ASSISTANCE MANAGEMENT MANUAL, DOD
DIRECTIVE, 5108.38-M, ch. 9).
110 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1995).
1' See ZARIN, supra note 9, at 11-8.
112 991 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert denied, 114 S.Ct. 286 (1993), cert denied
114 S.Ct. 650 (1993), and appeal after remand sub. nom., United States v. Sweeney, 44
F.3d 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
113 See id. at 828-29.
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financial operations in Europe and Asia.1 4 The first three fraud
convictions involved forms Ashton and Executive Vice President
David Dale filed with the Department of Defense in 1987 to obtain
a security clearance." 5 The fourth fraud count related to an
"Application for Small Business Determination" filed with the
Small Business Administration, on which Ashton failed to
mention her or Dale's interests or positions with various overseas
concerns."' The D.C. Circuit affirmed all of the convictions."
7
Similar charges were brought against an American military
contractor under the False Statements Act in United States v.
Liebo."' Although ultimately acquitted at trial, Liebo was indicted
not only for violations of the FCPA, but also for obtaining Foreign
Military Sales financing by submitting a false certification that no
"rebates, gifts, or gratuities" had been given contrary to law to
Nigerian officials."9  In both Dale and Liebo, illicit payments
abroad resulted in convictions at home; convictions entirely apart
from the provisions of the FCPA.
Similar reporting requirements apply to the sale of arms. The
AECA regulates the export of weapons abroad, and requires that,
"political contributions, gifts, commissions and fees paid, or
114 See id. at 826-28.
115 See id.
116 Id. at 829.
11 See id. at 859.
118 923 F.2d 1308 (8th Cir. 1991). "Liebo was acquitted at trial of conspiring to
defraud the United States and to commit other offenses in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371
(1988);" ten counts regarding the bribery and record keeping sections of the FCPA;
three counts of false corporate income tax reporting in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2)
(1988); and three counts of making false statements to the Defense Security Assistance
Agency, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988). Id. at 1310 n.1. This provision states:
Whoever ... knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any
trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or
fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or
document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent
statement or entry, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988). On the first day of trial the district court granted the
government's motion to drop one of the three charges regarding false statements. Liebo,
923 F.2d. at 1310 n.l.
119 Liebo, 923 F.2d. at 1310.
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offered or agreed to be paid, by any person in connection" with
"sales of defense articles or defense services... or of design and
construction services... [or] commercial sales of defense articles
or defense services, ' ' 0 are to be reported to the Department of
State. 2' The Act specifically targets payments made to gain
"improper influence."'22  In Dooley v. United Technologies
Corp.,123  for example, allegations that British defendants
participated in submitting misleading statements to the federal
government, as well as making payments in violation of the
AECA, were sufficient to establish violations of that Act as well as
the Money Laundering Control Act. 1
24
4. Tax Laws
In addition to the reporting requirements of the AECA, tax
laws have been used to attack international corruption and bribery.
For example, § 162 of the Internal Revenue Code 25 disallows tax
120 22 U.S.C. § 2779(a).
121 See id. "In accordance with such regulations as he may prescribe, the Secretary
of State shall require adequate and timely reporting ...." Id.
Such regulations shall specify the amounts and kinds of payments, offers, and
agreements to be reported, and the form and timing of reports, and shall require
reports on the names of sales agents and other persons receiving such payments.
The Secretary of State shall by regulation require such recordkeeping as he
determines is necessary.
Id.
122 Id. § 2779(c). The Act prescribes the following:
No such contribution, gift, commission, or fee may be included, in whole or in
part, in the amount paid under any procurement contract entered into under
section 2762 or section 2769 of this title, unless the amount thereof is
reasonable, allocable to such contract, and not made to a person who has
solicited, promoted, or otherwise secured such sale, or has held himself out as
being able to do so, through improper influence.
Id. (emphasis added).
123 803 F. Supp. 428, 441- 42 (D.D.C. 1992). The case involved the sale of 12
Blackhawk helicopters manufactured by defendant United Technologies Corp. (UTC) to
the Saudi Ministry of Defense and Aviation administered by the DOD. See id. at 431.
UTC allegedly agreed to pay bribes to Saudi businessmen and government officials. See
id.
124 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (1995). See Dooley, 803 F. Supp. at 441-42.
125 See Section 288(a) of the Tax Equity and Financial Responsibility Act of 1982,
Pub. L. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324, 26 U.S.C. § 162(c) (1988); 26 U.S.C. § 7454 (1988); 26
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deductions for payments that would be illegal under the FCPA. 16
Tax laws could prove to be an effective way to reach international
corruption, even where corporate activity might not be reached
under the FCPA. In United States v. Dale,'27 for example, tax
fraud convictions18 were upheld against American corporate
officers who made illegal payments to two Hong Kong
corporations for studies and services never performed.' 29 The court
further held that the tax code was not an exclusive weapon for
prosecuting tax fraud in international business transactions. 13
5. Title VII of the 1988 Trade Act
Title VII of the 1988 Trade and Competitiveness Act'3' (1988
Trade Act) requires the President to report annually to Congress
(until its expiration in April 1996) '32 on discrimination against U.S.
goods or services by foreign countries in government
procurement.' This function was delegated to the United States
Trade Representative,'34 who is charged with identifying countries
C.F.R. § 1.162-18 (1993).
126 For a discussion of payments illegal under the FCPA, see supra notes 9-11 and
accompanying text. For a detailed discussion of payments that are illegal under the
FCPA, see INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, supra note 9, at 321-25.
127 991 F.2d 819, 826-27, 859 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see supra notes 112-17 and
accompanying text.
18 Defendants were convicted, inter alia, under 26 U.S.C. § 7201, 7206(2) (1988).
See Dale, 991 F.2d at 831-32.
129 See Dale, 991 F.2d at 826-29. The case involved a complex scheme formed by
officers of Automated Data Management System, Inc. (ADM), an American firm. See
id. ADM had offices in Germany and Korea, through which ADM made illicit
payments to four shell corporations in Hong Kong, as well as to a Swiss investment
firm. See id.
130 See id. at 849. Defendants were also convicted of wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. §
1343. See id. Defendants wired $316,000 to a Swiss bank account as part of their tax
fraud scheme. See id. The court upheld their convictions for wire fraud. See id.
'3' Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102
Stat. 1107 § 5003(d)(2) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
132 The 1988 Amendments pursuant to Pub. L. 100-418 ceased to be effective on
April 30, 1996. See 19 U.S.C. § 2515 (Amendment of Section, Termination date of
1998 Amendment); see also discussion infra note 143.
133 See id.
134 See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ANNUAL REPORT ON
DISCRIMINATION IN FOREIGN GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT, Apr. 30, 1996 [hereinafter
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that fail to apply "transparent and competitive procedures." '135 The
1994 Amendments to Title VII'36 added new categories regarding
corrupt practices 137 . to countries not signatories to GATT's
Government Procurement Code. 3' Although the 1995 Annual
Report on Discrimination In Foreign Government Procurement
did not single out any particular country, it did address corrupt
practices as an area of important interest.' The 1996 Report,
published April 30, 1996, describes various anti-corruption
initiatives, including, "seeking a [WTO] mandate.., to launch a
broader negotiation on procurement among all WTO members to
develop an interim arrangement on transparency, openness and
due process in the procurement of goods and services.' 140  The
People's Republic of China was singled out in the report for non-
transparent procurement procedures.
4
'
Title VII called for consultations with countries identified in
the report, followed by sanctions if discriminatory practices are
not remedied within specified time frames.4 2 The extent to which
Title VII has effect now that it has expired remains to be seen, but
ANNUAL REPORT ON DISCRIMINATION].
135 Id.
136 Subsec. (d)(3)(c), Pub. L. 103-465 § 341(c)(2).
137 See 19 U.S.C. § 2515(d)(3)(c) (1994). The amendments provide that in
identifying foreign nations engaging in discrimination against American products, see
19 U.S.C. § 2515(d)(1), one consideration is "the failure to maintain and enforce
effective prohibitions on bribery and other corrupt practices in connection with
government procurement." 19 U.S.C. § 2515(d)(3)(c).
138 See id.; see also Office of the United States Trade Representative, Results of the
1995 Title VII Review, at III, available from USTR FAx RETRIEVAL SYSTEM (1-800-
USA-TRADE).
139 U.S. Dept. of Commerce, THE ANTI-CORRUPTION REVIEW, May 1, 1996, at 7-8
[hereinafter ANTI-CORRUPTION REVIEW].
140 Id.
141 See ANNUAL REPORT ON DISCRIMINATION, supra note 134.
With few exceptions, China's government procurement practices are not
transparent, open or competitive. For the most part, information on China's
procurement practices remains inaccessible to foreign suppliers. Purchasers for
virtually all projects in China are subject to at least one and usually several
approvals from governments at various levels ... [c]ompetition is by direct
negotiation rather than by competitive bid.
Id.
141 See id.
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identification of issues and countries made prior to that date will
continue. 143
6. Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974
With the expiration of Title VII, other unilateral measures may
be called upon to combat transnational bribery. An idea which has
been raised by at least one commentator,'" as well as Clinton
administration officials,145 is the use of proceedings prescribed
under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.' 4 Section 301 is a
unilateral remedy the United States may impose when foreign
nations engage in unjustifiable, unreasonable, 147 or discriminatory
conduct. 41 If either the President or the United States Trade
Representative is dissatisfied with the negotiated result regarding a
section 301 complaint, the United States may undertake retaliatory
proceedings against an offending nation.1
49
In March 1996, Secretary of Commerce Mickey Kantor
suggested using section 301 sanctions as a method of fighting
foreign corruption. ° Some point out that use of section 301
143 See id. The bribery and corruption provisions of Title VII, 19 U.S.C. §
2515(d)(3)(c) expired on April 30, 1996, pursuant to § 7004 of the 1988 Act, which
terminated subsections (d)-(k) of 19 U.S.C. § 255. See History; Ancillary Laws &
Directives, 19 U.S.C.S. § 2515 (1996).
'44 See Mark. J. Murphy, Note, International Bribery: An Example of an Unfair
Trade Practice?, 21 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 385, 389 (1995).
145 Helene Cooper, Kantor Suggests Using Trade Sanctions As a Way to Fight
Foreign Corruption, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 1996, at A2.
'46 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1994).
147 See INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, supra note 9, at 532.
Foreign country practices are "unreasonable" if they are unfair and inequitable,
regardless of whether they are in violation of or inconsistent with the
international legal rights of the United States. Unreasonable practices include
those which deny fair and equitable opportunities for the establishment of a
business abroad, those which provide inadequate or ineffective protection of
intellectual property rights, those which deny market opportunities as a result of
systematic anticompetitive activities of private firms, and those which
constitute export targeting ....
Id. at 532.
148 See id.
149 See id. at 534.
Io See Cooper, supra note 145, at A2.
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would not only advance the stated goal of ensuring access and
equitable conditions for U.S. commerce, but would also promote
those same conditions in international business.' One proponent
of using section 301 to fight foreign corruption concludes, "[t]he
use of section 301, at least in the context of combating bribery, is
an instance where aggressive unilateralism can actually advance
the goal of establishing a multilateral world trading regime."'52
B. Federal Laws that Permit Private Actions by Injured
Parties
The federal government is not the only actor in the fight
against corruption. While private causes of action are not
provided for under the FCPA, it is clear that private parties injured
or damaged by international business corruption are aggressively
searching for ways to use the legal system to recover their
damages and to expose their adversaries.' Furthermore, private
parties have a greater incentive to do so.1
4
1. Robinson-Patman Act
Section 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act' forbids the
151 See Murphy, supra note 144, at 403.
The elimination of international bribery certainly advances the goal of insuring
'fair and equitable conditions for U.S. commerce,' but it also has the effect of
insuring those same conditions for international commerce, ... [W]ith the
emergence of a new world trade order, the best interests of the United States
and those of the rest of the international economic community can no longer be
seen as mutually exclusive.
Id. at 403-04 (quoting S. REP. No. 93-1298, at 164 (1974)).
152 Id. at 404.
153 See infra notes 158-94 and accompanying text.
154 For this reason some commentators have suggested amending the FCPA to
include a private right of action, in order to make the Act self-policing. See Pines, supra
note 26, at 185. Lamb v. Philip Morris, 915 F.2d 1024 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied 111
S. Ct. 961 (1991), decided by the Sixth Circuit in 1990, is the leading case on whether a
private right exists regarding illicit foreign payments. The Lamb court expressly found
that allowing an implicit right of action would contravene the FCPA compliance
program currently in place, and that alternative means, notably in the realm of antitrust
law, already existed. See id. at 1030. Later rulings have followed these lines. See Anti-
Corruption Review, supra note 139, at 11-18, 11-19; Citicorp Int'l Trading Co. v.
Western Oil & Refining Co., 771 F. Supp. 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
'55 15 U.S.C. §§ 13a, 13b, 21a (1996).
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payment of brokerage fees, commissions, and other illegitimate
compensation to agents in connection with the sale of goods. 5 6
Although principally a tool against price discrimination, courts
have held that section 2(c) does prohibit commercial bribery.57
Private plaintiffs have used section 2(c) effectively against
competitors engaging in illicit payments.
In Environmental Tectonics, the Third Circuit held that the
passing of payments from "seller to buyer" (from Kirkpatrick to
Nigerian sources) was clearly a violation of section 2(c).'58 The
standing requirement of the Robinson-Patman Act was satisfied as
well, in that "it is generally agreed that a direct competitor of a
company that obtains a contract through commercial bribery has
standing to press a 2(c) claim against the briber."'59 The court
observed that a more direct injury than losing business to a
competitor due to illicit payments would be hard to imagine. 6
Similarly, in Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, Ltd.,'61
Hitachi Cable's bribery of two employees of the municipality of
Anchorage led to various charges, including violations of the
Robinson-Patman Act.1
62
156 See Clayton Act § 2(c), as amended by Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination
Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 13(c).
157 See Environmental Tectonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 847 F.2d 1052, 1066
(3rd Cir. 1988). (For discussions of the other issues in Environmental Tectonics see
supra notes 83-85, 93-100 and accompanying text.) For decisions holding that the
Robinson-Patman Act prohibits bribery generally, see Metrix Warehouse, Inc. v.
Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft, 716 F.2d 245, 246 (4th Cir. 1983); Calnetics Corp. v.
Volkswagen of America, Inc., 532 F.2d 674, 696 (9th Cir. 1976) cert. denied, 429 U.S.
940 (1940).
158 See Environmental Tectonics, 847 F.2d at 1066.
159 Id.
'60 See id. at 1067.
161 547 F. Supp. 633 (D. Alaska 1982).
162 See id. at 637. Hitachi argued that the municipality lacked standing to sue,
based on the argument that when a seller bribes a buyer's agent, only competitors of the
seller suffer competitive injury. See id. The court expressly rejected this narrow reading
of the standing requirement of § 2(c), holding that "when commercial bribes are paid to
a company's employees to obtain contracts for the sale of goods, the company has
standing to sue under section 2(c) ..... Id. at 641.
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2. Sherman Antitrust Act
Similarly, private plaintiffs are attempting to broaden Sherman
Act163 coverage to reach commercial bribery. 64  Section 1 of the
Sherman Act has been interpreted as prohibiting "unreasonable
restraints of trade,' ' 65 typically anticompetitive agreements among
competitors in the form of price fixing, 166 sharing of price
information, 16 or prohibitions on competitive bidding by members
of a commercial organization.1 6' Recently the Sherman Act also
has been used to address bribery in international business
transactions. 169 Bribery, like other anti-competitive arrangements,
163 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988). Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides: "every
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is declared to be
illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). Section 2 provides, "[e]very person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony .... 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
164 Gevurtz, supra note 28, at 367 n.8.
165 The classic rule formulation can be found in Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1, 31 S.Ct. 502 (1911). "If the criterion by which it is to be
determined in all cases whether every contract, combination, etc., is a restraint of trade
within the intendment of the law, is the direct or indirect effect of the acts involved, then
of course the rule of reason becomes the guide...." Id. at 66. The Standard Oil
formulation of the rule of reason has been used to distinguish permissible from
impermissible exclusionary practices in monopolization cases. HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 248 (1994). In current antitrust litigation, most
exclusionary practices are analyzed under the rule of reason. See id. See, e.g., Aspen
Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985) (finding that a
dominant ski company that refused to continue a joint venture with a competitor was
only explicable as an attempt to destroy competition).
166 See, e.g., Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939) (holding
that licenses to theaters which required a minimum price of admission and other
restraints was a violation of the Sherman Act).
167 See, e.g., Sugar Inst., Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936) (holding that a
trade association controlling nearly all imported raw sugar and supplying 70 to 80
percent of refined sugar; and collecting and disseminating data concerning, inter alia,
prices and terms and conditions of sale; was an unreasonable restraint, especially where
steps were undertaken to secure undeviating adherence to prices and terms).
168 See, e.g., National Society of Prof I Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679
(1978) (holding that a professional organization's canon of ethics prohibiting its
members from submitting competitive bids for services was a violation of § I of the
Sherman Act).
169 See infra notes 179-83 and accompanying text.
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is increasingly regarded as a restraint of trade.17 Accordingly,
commercial bribery claims are being prosecuted with increased
regularity,'7' although outcomes in these cases are often
criticized.'72
One line of cases, beginning with Parmelee Transportation
Co. v. Keeshin,"'1 concluded that commercial bribery was not a
classic "restraint to trade" and therefore was beyond the scope of
the Sherman Act. 74  In Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi
Cable Ltd.,' a federal district court in Alaska applied this
reasoning to bribery in the context of international business
transactions.' In that case bribes by Hitachi Cable officials were,
by themselves, insufficient to sustain a Sherman claim.' The
court conceded, however, that "where- commercial bribery is
coupled with other acts tending to restrain trade, a claim under the
Sherman Act may be established."'7
A different approach, which views commercial bribery more as
an "unfair trade practice" reachable by the Sherman Act, was
adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Associated Radio 'Service Co. v.
Page Airways, Inc.' The Page Airways court noted, "if buyers
170 3 PHILIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW § 738b at 279-80
(1978) (assessing situations where bribery can be punished as an unreasonable restraint
of trade).
'"' See id.; see also Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable Ltd., 547 F. Supp.
633, 645 (D. Alaska 1982) (noting that commercial bribery coupled with other acts
tending to restrain trade establishes a claim under the Sherman Act).
172 See Gevurtz, supra note 28, at 365-66 (noting that prosecutions under the
Sherman Act "have yielded results and methods of analysis that are often inconsistent
and usually erroneous").
173 292 F.2d 794 (7th Cir), cert denied, 368 U.S. 944 (1961).
14 Id. at 804. This formal reading of the Sherman Act was followed by the United
States District Court for the District of Idaho in Sterling Nelson & Sons, Inc. v. Rangen,
Inc., 235 F. Supp. 393 (N. Idaho 1964), af'd on other grounds, 351 F.2d 851 (9th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966), as well as by the Ninth Circuit in Calnetics
Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, 532 F.2d 674 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 940 (1976).
171 547 F. Supp. 633 (D. Alaska 1982).
176 See id. at 645.
177 See id.
178 Id.
179 624 F.2d 1342 (5th Cir. 1980), cert denied 450 U.S. 1030 (1981).
[Vol. 22
ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
were influenced through bribes or similar practices, this might
constitute an exclusionary practice in violation of section 2 [of the
Sherman Act]."'' 0  The Page Airways ruling appears to accord
more with scholarly opinion. Philip Areeda and Donald F.
Turner's treatise on Antitrust, alluded to by the Page Airways
court, points out that
[t]here may be instances in which the means used by the
monopolist are unlawful or otherwise clearly improper. For
example... the monopolist might 'bribe' the supplier's
employee who is thus induced to act in his personal interest and
not in his employer's interest. Such improprieties can be
exclusionary for § 2 purposes whenever they have a significant
impact upon the competitive vitality of the rival.'
As Areeda and Turner point out, bribery is substantively different
from other anticompetitive behavior (such as misrepresenting
one's own or a rival's product)."2
Despite problems inherent in Sherman Act cases, some experts
believe the Act will likely become an increasingly popular weapon
against commercial bribery because of the Act's broad
jurisdictional reach, its access to the federal courts, and its
provision for treble damages and recovery of attorney's fees."3
3. Employment Discrimination
Suits by employees fired for their refusal to participate in
illegal bribery schemes have recently proven an effective and
lucrative means of private relief.14 Originally, the FCPA included
what was referred to as the Eckhardt Amendment, 5 which
disallowed FCPA actions against employees without first going
180 Page Airways, 624 F.2d at 1354 (quoting 3 PHILIP AREEDA & DONALD F.
TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW § 738b at 279-80 (1978)). In assessing exclusionary tactics by
the defendants, the Page Airways court also found relevant the evidence of foreign
bribery coupled with the fact that Page had paid $10,000 over the next highest bid,
permitting the proper inference of corrupt practices. See id. at 1354.
181 3 PHILIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW § 738e at 282 (1978).
182 See id.
183 See Gevurtz, supra note 28, at 367.
184 See INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, supra note 9, at 330.
185 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(b)(3), 78ff(c)(3) (1977) (amended 1988).
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after the employer.'86 The Eckhardt Amendment was eliminated in
1988, allowing the government to prosecute employees directly
and independently.'87 This raised the possibility of low-level
employees being used as scapegoats when illegal payment
schemes were discovered. 8 The added ability of employees to sue
their former employers for wrongful discharge, or breach of
contract, leveled the playing field.
In Williams v. Hall,'89 for example, employment discrimination
claims were asserted against a former employer (a petroleum
company) that allegedly fired employees because of their refusal
to participate in illicit international payments. 9" The employees
186 See INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, supra note 9, at 330.
187 See id. The intent of the Eckhardt Amendment was to prevent a company from
labeling an employee as a renegade and making an employee a scapegoat for the
company's misdeeds. See 133 CONG. REC. S2105 (1987) (statement of Senator Robert
Dole on the Trade, Employment, and Productivity Act of 1987). The lead-in clause of
the Eckhardt Amendment read, "whenever an issuer/domestic concern is found to have
violated .... 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(b)(3) (amended 1988); see 134 CONG. REC. H1863
(1988) (conference report on H.R. 3, Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988).
The provision was narrowly construed by the Fifth Circuit in United States v. McLean,
738 F.2d 655 (1984), thereby, in Senator Dole's words, "prevent[ing] the Government
from prosecuting an individual even where the company was convicted of a conspiracy
to violate the FCPA." 133 CONG. REC. S2105 (1987) (statement of Senator Robert
Dole). The 1988 amendments allowed suits to be brought directly against the employee,
the employer, or both, effectively broadening the reach of FCPA enforcement. See
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, supra note 9, at 330.
188 See INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, supra note 9, at 330. "An
employer may now urge the government to bring suit directly against the employee who
made the payment, even if the payment was authorized by other higher level officials.
The possibility of a scapegoat is back." Id.
189 683 F. Supp. 639 (E.D.Ky. 1988). A related case, McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc.,
No. 84-291 (E.D.Ky), was consolidated for discovery and for trial with a suit brought by
a second employee named Harry Williams. The consolidated case was called Williams
v. Hall, 683 F. Supp. 639 (E.D.Ky. 1988). Later cases such as Bowman v. Western Auto,
985 F.2d 383 (8th Cir.), cert denied 508 U.S. 957 (1993), have criticized Williams. The
Eighth Circuit in Bowman disallowed for lack of standing the claim of an employee who
alleged he was fired for not participating in racketeering from bringing RICO charges.
See id. at 385. The court found he was not harmed by RICO predicate acts committed in
furtherance of a felony. See id. Other cases have restricted RICO standing as well. See,
e.g., Hecht v. Commerce Clearing House, 897 F.2d 21 (2nd Cir. 1990) (denied standing
to a fired employee). The Hecht court held that the purpose of RICO liability was not to
deter every illegal act, such as retaliatory firings, where there existed state or common
law remedies. See id. at 24.
190 See Williams, 683 F. Supp. at 639.
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claimed that their employer had engaged in a RICO conspiracy by
paying bribes to officials in the Middle East, and that their firing
was part of the cover-up. 91 The jury found that the employer had
breached its employment contract and had wrongfully discharged
the employees in violation of public policy.'92 Ultimately, a lump-
sum settlement of $25 million was reached between the parties.'93
One observer noted that the company had "learned that firing an
employee for refusing to make an illegal payment abroad can be
costly.'
194
Several courts have dealt with wrongful termination suits
brought by employees who refused to engage in illicit payments or
other corrupt activities abroad. In doing so, states which allow
termination-at-will (except where it conflicts with public policy)
have looked to the public policy considerations behind the
FCPA--honesty in international business transactions-for
guidance in construing state law. The Washington Supreme Court
effectively adopted the FCPA as the state law standard in
Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co.,"'s which allowed a tort action for
wrongful discharge where the plaintiff alleged that he was fired for
instituting an internal compliance program.'96 Similarly in Adler v.
191 See id.
192 See id. For a recounting of the Williams trial as well as post-trial developments,
see McKay v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 465, 470 (1994), a related case concerning the tax
status of the settlement proceedings. In Williams, with respect to the breach of contract
claim, the jury found that McKay had not been fired for just cause. See id. With respect
to the wrongful discharge claim, the jury found that the following factors influenced the
firing: (1) plaintiffs refusal to make illicit payments, and (2) his refusal to commit
perjury to the IRS in covering up the payments. See id. at 470-71.
193 See id. The jury awarded plaintiff McKay $1,602,103 as damages for lost
compensation between January 1, 1984, and the time of trial in 1988, and future
damages of $12,846,209. See id. at 471. The damages were trebled to over $43 million
for RICO violations. See id. McKay also received $125,000 in punitive damages. See
id. A settlement in the case was reached on August 26, 1988. See id. Pursuant to the
settlement agreement, of the $16,744,300 going to McKay, $12,250,215 was paid for
the wrongful discharge tort claim, and $2,044,085 for breach of his employment
contract. See id. at 472. Plaintiff Williams received the remainder of the $25 million.
See id.
194 INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, supra note 9, at 331.
191 685 P.2d 1081, 1089 (Wash. 1984).
196 See id.
1997]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG.
American Standard Corp.,"' an employee claimed he was
discharged for discovering illegal bribery of Mexican officials by
corporate officers.' 98 The court found a "clear mandate of public
policy [against bribery] was allegedly contravened by this
discharge."' 99
C. State Remedies
Beyond the employment law context, state regulation of
international business conduct has typically been less aggressive
and less effective than federal initiatives. Every state has various
criminal or civil penalties for commercial bribery and unfair
competition, though apparently none specifically address bribery
in international business transactions; almost all are limited to
actions committed within the state's borders. °00  The
Environmental Tectonics court, however, allowed New Jersey
state racketeering charges (similar to federal RICO charges) to
proceed against the defendants.2'
Some state laws against commercial bribery have been
extended to cover international business transactions. A New
York penal law proscribing bribery of non-public servants2 2 was at
issue in United States v. Young & Rubicam, Inc.2"3 In that case, the
court noted the statute's purpose of "prohibiting and punishing
corruption of any commercial transaction within [New York's]
borders," including those involving foreign corporations.2°0 In the
'7 538 F. Supp. 572, 577 (D. Md. 1982), aff'd and rev'd on appeal on other
grounds, 830 F.2d 1303 (4th Cir. 1987).
198 See id.
199 Id. at 578.
200 See Lamb v. Phillip Morris, 915 F.2d 1024, 1030 (6th Cir. 1990), cert denied,
111 S. Ct. 961 (1991) (citing the lack of state laws proscribing bribery specifically in
international business transactions).
201 Environmental Tectonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 847 F.2d 1052, 1064 (3rd
Cir. 1988).
202 N.Y. PENAL §§ 180.00, 180.05.
203 741 F. Supp. 334, 339 (D. Conn. 1990).
204 Id. The court held that
[t]o construct the statute to apply only to bribery of persons in private business
is to suggest that [the] State of New York intended not to prosecute instances of
bribery occurring within its borders by New York corporations involving non-
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related case of Abrahams v. Young & Rubicam, Inc.,"' plaintiff
claimed that defendant's alleged foreign bribery violated a
Connecticut unfair trade statute.2 6. The Second Circuit, fearing a
misinterpretation of Connecticut law, severed the state law claim
and certified it to the Connecticut Supreme Court.2"7
Connecticut is not alone in providing civil and criminal relief
to corporations injured by corruption in international transactions.
New York also provides a civil remedy for violation of its criminal
statute, and even allows a defense to the enforcement of contracts
tainted by such business practices.2"' Colorado has a law against
New York public officials. Such an interpretation would be inconsistent with
the statutory purpose, of prohibiting and punishing corruption of any
commercial transaction within its borders.
Id. at 339.
205 79 F.3d 234 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 66 (1996).
206 See id. at 239. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-110b(a) (1994) prohibits "unfair
methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any
trade or commerce."
Abrahams, the former Minister of Tourism and Information for the Jamaican
government, claimed that he had been falsely accused of participating in a bribery
conspiracy. See Abrahams v. Young & Rubicam, 79 F.3d at 236. In the early 1980s, the
Young and Rubicam advertising agency had funneled nearly a million dollars to a
Jamaican and an American who claimed they could obtain advertising by bribing
Abrahams. See id. All the money was apparently kept by the two intermediaries. See
id. Abrahams claimed he learned of the scheme only when he, the agency, and the two
intermediaries were indicted in 1989, and that he had suffered emotionally, financially,
and socially from the false allegations. See id.
207 Abrahams v. Young & Rubicam, 79 F.3d at 239.
Bribery to obtain a commercial advantage is surely an unfair trade practice ....
There is no dispositive Connecticut case law as to whether [the Connecticut
Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA)] protects a person in Abraham's position
against the harm that befell him. Any decision of that issue would involve
setting parameters on CUTPA claims that might affect numerous other factual
situations. We are reluctant to put either a narrowing or expanding gloss on the
statute; not only might it misconstrue Connecticut law, but it might also lead to
forum shopping to achieve or avoid federal disposition of unusual CUTPA
claims.
Id. at 239. The Connecticut Supreme Court has yet to rule on the issue.
208 See Mark Miller, America Singing: The Role of Custom & Usage in the
Thoroughbred Horse Business, 74 Ky. L.J. 781, 826 (1995). Many laws against
commercial bribery understandably overlap with other provisions of corporate law
regarding breaches of fiduciary duty, which could apply to international business
transactions if the right set of facts arose. Illinois, for example, has a special provision
in its corporate law that makes any director or officer liable to their corporation for
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"commercial bribery and breach of duty to act disinterestedly,"
which prescribes that officers, directors, as well as consultants,
professional advisors-which would include lawyers-and other
professionals, make fair and impartial decisions.29
Recently, in D'Agostino v. Johnson & Johnson,21° the New
Jersey Supreme Court adopted the FCPA as state policy as well. "
Richard D'Agostino, an American citizen but long-time resident of
Switzerland, was employed by a Swiss subsidiary of Johnson &
Johnson.212  D'Agostino refused to sign vouchers authorizing
payments to Swiss officials responsible for registering new drugs
and was thereafter discharged.213 The court noted, "[n]ot only can
federal policy constitute state policy, it can also apply
extraterritorially when Congress intends that the policy have
treble damages if they offer or receive a commercial bribe. See 805 ILL. ANN. STAT.
5/8.65 (West 1993); see also John A. MacKerron, Variety of Choice in the Corporate
Law 'Menu' of the Great Lake States, 71 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 469, 485 n.105
(1994). Some cases have allowed shareholders to bring an action against corporate
directors for violation of their fiduciary duties when engaging in bribery. See Miller v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1974); see also Gevurtz, supra note 28,
at 365 n.3. In Miller, a case involving not bribery but failure to collect an outstanding
debt owed the corporation by the Democratic National Committee, the court found that
the failure to collect the debt was sufficient to state a claim against the corporation and
all but one member of the board of directors in a stockholder derivative action for breach
of fiduciary duty. Miller, 507 F.2d at 761.
209 COLO. REV. STAT. § 18.5.401 (1986); see also Carry N. Baker, Sexual Extortion:
Criminalizing Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment, 13 LAW & INEQ. J. 213, 239 (1994).
In 1988 the Tenth Circuit reversed an earlier ruling that had declared Colorado's
commercial bribery statute void for vagueness. See United States v. Gaudreau, 860 F.2d
357 (10th Cir. 1988). The court held that prohibiting enumerated classes of people from
"knowingly violating or agreeing to violate a duty of fidelity," provided sufficiently
clear, objective standards to satisfy due process, when applied to defendants accused of
bribing a corporate officer to compromise the corporation's interest. Id. at 359.
Colorado's commercial bribery statute duplicates the American Law Institute Model
Penal Code § 228.4 provisions, except that the MPC proposes misdemeanor penalties
whereas the Colorado statute is a felony. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 18.5.401. Similar
commercial bribery statutes have been uniformly upheld in challenges on grounds of
vagueness. See Ex Parte Mattox, 683 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. App. 3 Dist. 1984); United States
v. Perrin, 580 F.2d 730, 735 (5th. Cir. 1978); State v. Brewer, 258 N.C. 533, 129 S.E.2d
262, 277 (1963), appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, 375 U.S. 9
(1963); People v. Nankervis, 46 N.W.2d 592, 595 (Mich. 1951).
210 628 A.2d 305, 313-14 (N.J. 1993).
211 Seeid. at313-14.
212 See id. at 307.
213 See id. at 308.
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overseas applications. ' 14 This consideration, plus New Jersey's
strong public policy interest in resolving the dispute, was enough
to outweigh Switzerland's interest in at-will employment. 5 In so
doing, New Jersey joined a growing number of states which have
decided that state law can and should be a weapon in the fight
against international bribery.
D. Other U.S. Initiatives
In addition to federal civil sanctions, the United States has also
supported less formal initiatives against corruption. In February of
1995, the American Bar Association Section on International Law
& Practice adopted resolutions supporting efforts by the
international community, national governments, and non-
governmental organizations to fight corrupt practices in
international businesses. 6
The Clinton Administration recently released what it calls
Model Business Principles217 for firms engaged in international
business to encourage "good corporate citizenship [which] makes
a positive contribution to the communities in which the company
operates; and where ethical conduct is recognized, valued, and
exemplified by all employees.2 18  Principle Four calls for,
"[c]ompliance with US and local laws promoting good business
practices, including laws prohibiting illicit payments and ensuring
fair competition.,
219
The FCPA has attracted renewed attention in Congress.2
214 Id. at 315.
215 See id. at 315-16.
216 The American Bar Association Resolution can be found in ABA Section of
International Law & Practice Reports to the House of Delegates, adopted Feb. 1995,
reprinted in INT'L L., Spring 1996, at 193.
217 U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Model Business Principles, May 26, 1996. Among
those multinational companies publicly supporting the Model Business Principles as a
"useful reference point" are Boeing, Honeywell, GE, and Westinghouse. Administration
Releases Details on Voluntary Business Principles, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 935 (May
31, 1995).
218 U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Model Business Principles, May 26, 1996.
219 Id.
220 See 142 CONG. REc. S4833 (May 8, 1996) (statement of Senator Feingold
concerning international trade and bribery). "[I]f international markets are indeed to
4251997]
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Colorado Senator Hank Brown's proposed bill, referred to as the
"FCPA of 1996,"22' would have amended section 301 to make
foreign nations which tolerate illicit payments guilty of creating an
unfair trade barrier to U.S. exports.22   The draft bill also would
authorize Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)
benefits only to countries that have laws comparable to the
FCPA.223 In addition, the bill proposes a private cause of action
against companies that "obtain or retain the business that the
plaintiff competed for in a foreign country, 22 4 where the offending
corporation obtained such business through the "payment, gift,
offer, or promise of anything of value to a foreign official." '225
Guilty defendants would be liable for three times the value of the
business lost, plus legal fees. 6
While Senator Brown's bill has yet to be introduced, towards
the end of the 104th Congress Pennsylvania Senator Arlen Specter
introduced the "Fair Trade Practices Act. 227 The bill called for the
President to submit annual reports to Congress identifying foreign
persons and corporations that engage in corrupt trade practices,
and foreign countries that do not have or do not enforce laws
similar to the FCPA.228 The report would also include information
connect nations around the globe, somehow we have to be able to conduct business in a
transparent and responsible manner. Bribery has to be discouraged, not rewarded, by all
governments." Id.; see also S. RES. 89, 104th Cong. (1995) (commending the Clinton
Administration's efforts in promoting transparency in international business
transactions, and urging universal adoption of the principles of the FCPA).
221 S. __ 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996), available from Senator Hank Brown's
office.
222 See id. § 2. The bill would have amended section 301(d)(3)(B)(i) of the 1974
Trade Act to allow sanctions against nations which condone or allow bribery of their
officials. See id. § 3(2)(V), (VI).
223 See id. § 4. Section 4 would amend Section 231 A of the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961 to read, "[t]he Corporation may insure, reinsure, guarantee, or finance a project
only if the country in which the project is to be undertaken is taking steps to adopt and
implement laws that are substantially similar to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of
1977 .... Id. § 4(2).
224 Id. § 3(a)(2)(A).
225 Id. § 3(a)(2)(B).
226 See id. § 3(a)(3)(A)-(C).
227 S. 2165, 104th Cong. (1996); see 142 CONG. REc. S12349 (October 3, 1996)
(statement of Senator Arlen Specter).
228 See S. 2165 § 2(a)(1)(A).
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regarding corrupt practices229 and efforts by foreign nations to
curtail such activities.3 Under the bill, if the President were to
determine that a nation identified. in such a report "is not making a
good faith effort to enact or enforce" laws similar to the FCPA, he
is "authorized and directed" to enforce sanctions.2 ' Sanctions
against nations would include reductions in either foreign aid 232 or
multilateral development bank assistance. 3 Sanctions against
foreign persons or corporations would be levied if, inter alia, they
are found in violation of the FCPA and "such conduct has placed a
United States concern at a competitive disadvantage." '234 Persons
or corporations could be barred from government procurement,
2 35
or from obtaining licenses to conduct business in the United
States.236
The Clinton Administration has also spoken out plainly against
corruption. Speaking at the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) in June 1994, then
Secretary of State Warren Christopher stressed the "vital objective
of build[ing] an international consensus against the bribery of
foreign officials in international business transactions." '237 On
February 16, 1996, then Trade Representative Mickey Kantor
229 See id. § 2(a)(1)(B)(i).
230 See id. § 2(a)(l)(B)(ii).
231 Id. § 2(b)(1).
232 See id. § 2(b)(2)(a).
Fifty percent of the assistance made available under part I of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 and allocated each fiscal year pursuant to section 653 of
such Act for a country shall be withheld from obligation and expenditure for
any fiscal year in which a determination been made ...with respect to the
country.
Id.
233 See id. § 2(b)(2)(b). "The United States Government shall oppose, in
accordance with section 701 of the International Financial Institutions Act, 22 U.S.C.
262d, the extension of any loan or financial or technical assistance by international
financial institutions to any country [in violation]." Id.
234 Id. § 3(a)(1).
235 See id. § 3(b)(1)(A).
236 See id. § 3(b)(1)(B).
237 Gevurtz, supra note 28, at 396; see Murphy, supra note 144, at 385, 387, 388
n.19.
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wrote to the Director General of the WTO, stressing his concern
that corruption would continue to be a barrier to trade among
WTO member states.118  "[W]e must find a role for the WTO,"
Kantor wrote, "[and] an important first step would be through
increasing transparency, openness and due process in government
procurement systems in all WTO member countries." '239
IV. The Global Fight Against Corruption-Foreign and
Multinational Efforts
A. The Moral Issue
1. Bribery is Universally Shameful
Virtually every nation in the world has criminal penalties
against bribery.2 4' Even where practiced openly and extensively, it
remains taboo, not to be spoken of publicly.241 Commercial
bribery, therefore, is not a cultural difference, to be respected as
"diverse. 2 42 Nowhere in the world do high government officials
238 See Anti-Corruption Review, supra note 139, at 2.
239 Id. Kantor was concerned that "bribery and corruption in international markets
of WTO members may compromise the progressive elimination of trade barriers," that
the Uruguay Round had achieved. Id.
240 See INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, supra note 9, at 335.
241 See DE GEORGE, supra note 28, at 104.
242 See id. at 103-05. For an analysis exploding the myth of cultural relativity as it
relates to bribery see Transparency International, The TI Source Book, Part A:
Analytical Framework, ch.2 (Sept. 21, 1996) <http://www.transparency.de/sourcebook/
PartA/Chapterjl/index.html> [hereinafter TI SOURCE BOOK]. General Olusegun
Obsanjo, former President of Nigeria, put it well when he assessed the false nexus
between bribery and culture:
I shudder at how an integral aspect of our culture could be taken as the basis for
rationalizing otherwise despicable behaviour. In the African concept of
appreciation and hospitality, the gift is usually a token. It is not demanded.
The value is usually in the spirit rather than in the material worth. It is usually
done in the open, and never in secret. Where it is excessive, it becomes an
embarrassment and it is returned. If anything, corruption has perverted and
destroyed this aspect of our culture.
Id. (quoting Benin Cotonou, Corruption, Democracy and Human Rights in Africa,
keynote address to Africa Leadership Forum on Corruption, Democracy and Human
Rights in Africa, Sept. 1994, at 21) (statement of Gen. Olusegun Obsanjo); see
AYODELE ADERINWALE, CORRUPTION, DEMOCRACY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN WEST
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openly practice or condone bribery.2 43 Indeed, as legal scholar and
U.S. Court of Appeals Judge John T. Noonan, Jr. has observed,
bribery is universally shameful.24  He points out that
[t]here are some laws such as those on gambling that are
constantly broken without any particular sense of shame
attaching to the offense. Bribery is not among them. In no
country do bribe takers speak publicly of their bribes, or bribe
givers announce the bribes they pay. No newspapers lists
them .... No one is honored precisely because he is a big
briber or a big bribee.2 5
The universal disapproval of bribery suggests that as developing
nations achieve greater prosperity and democracy, bribery will be
tolerated less and less.246
2. Corruption and "Colonial Imperialism"
Previously, many Westerners regarded corruption as a cultural
attribute.2 47  As Judge Noonan emphasizes, "it is often the
Westerner with ethnocentric prejudice who supposes that a modem
Asian or African society does not regard the act of bribery as
shameful in the way Westerners regard it. 2 4  Singapore, which
now has one of the most stringent and effective policies against
AFRICA (ALF Publications, Ibadan, 1995).
243 See DE GEORGE, supra note 28, at 104. The author asserts that
[i]n no country do high government officials openly practice and publicly
justify the acceptance of large sums of money for preferential treatment. If the
practice were ethically justifiable and acceptable to the public, the whole point
of paying bribes would be lost. It would become a normal way of doing
business, and no special advantages could be gained from it.
Id.
244 See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., BRIBES 702-03 (1994).
245 Id.
246 Robert Leiken suggests this dynamic is at work today. See Hearings on Int'l
Crime, supra note 3. He notes that clean government movements have sprouted in
nations as diverse as Italy, Cambodia, Argentina, Hungary, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, El
Salvador, South Korea, Thailand, and Venezuela. See id. Leiken points out that,
"strengthening civil society and modernizing the state are complimentary not
antithetical. Together they comprise a crucial dimension of an anti-corruption strategy."
Id.
247 See ROBERT KLITGAARD, CONTROLLING CORRUPTION 10-11 (1988).
248 Id. Indeed, Transparency International points out that in many instances,
bribery originated with the colonial powers. See TI SOURCE BOOK, supra note 242.
19971
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
corruption,2 49 has consistently deplored the double standard many
used to justify illegality abroad.25 Singapore's Minister of Foreign
Affairs spokesman has stated,
I think it is monstrous for these well-intentioned and largely
misguided scholars to suggest corruption as a practical and
efficient instrument for rapid development in Asia and
Africa .... The current defense of Kleptocracy is a new kind
of opium by some Western intellectuals, devised to perpetuate
Asian backwardness and degradation.251
3. Nigeria
As Singapore's tough stand against bribery illustrates,
developing nations are becoming less likely to condone corrupt
practices. These nations recognize that countries that tolerate
corruption are increasingly seen as pariahs by international
businessmen.252 Nigeria is infamous for its ubiquitous scam-
letters.253 Gullible, naive, and greedy accomplices in the U.S. and
other countries have lost millions of dollars, and, in at least two
instances, their lives.5 "[F]raudulent activities have adversely
affected Nigerian efforts to expand legitimate commercial links
with its trading partners." '255 A report on the impact of such fraud
concluded that, "Nigeria's large number of reputable firms have
249 See Geoffrey Crothall, China: Mayor Urged to Lead Battle on Corruption, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 16, 1991; Andrew Taylor, Singapore Exposes Tip of
Corruption Iceberg, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1996, at 4; Chuang Peck Ming, Foreign
Businessmen Welcome OECD's Anti-corruption Move, Bus. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1996, at 3.
250 See KLITGAARD, supra note 247, at 29.
251 Id.
252 See Ettorre, supra note 8.
253 See The Great Nigerian Scam, ECONOMIST, Jan. 7, 1995, at 36. In the 1980s, so-
called "419 letters," named after the section of the British penal code that deals with
such fraud, were sent to thousands of potential victims in Europe and elsewhere. Id.
The year 1995 saw "such a resurgence of these letters, dispatched from Nigeria to
Europe and beyond, that credulous foreigners.., lost millions." Id.
254 See Fraudulent Business Activity Is Growing in Nigeria, Bus. AM., Jan. 13,
1992, at 21 [hereinafter Fraudulent Business Activity]; Nick Green, Get-Rich-Schemes
Based in Nigeria Are Targeted by Authorities, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1995, at 4; Michael
Gillard, Racketeering: African Conmen Rip Off the Greedy & Gullible, OBSERVER, Jan.
14, 1996, at 10.
255 Fraudulent Business Activity, supra note 254, at 21.
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encountered increasing reluctance on the part of foreign businesses
to conduct business with them, due to the activities of a relatively
few [corrupt] individuals." '256
4. Attitudes are Changing
Despite the pervasive corruption in places such as Nigeria, it is
clear that attitudes in the developing world are changing. One
expert has asserted, "Asian nations are telling us that in many of
their markets [bribery] is viewed as unacceptable and destructive
to their economies." '257 A new generation of Third World leaders,
many of whom were educated at western institutions such as
Harvard or the London School of Economics, is returning home to
see their native countries being ruined by corruption, and they will
no longer stand for it. The new president of Tanzania, Benjamin
Mkapa, for example, recently made public both his and his wife's
income and assets, and how they were acquired."
The transparency trend, while discernible, is developing
slowly, but inexorably. Corporations, no less than governments,
have had difficulty abandoning the Cold War, business-as-usual
mentality. According to Frank Vogl, the Vice President of
Transparency International,.. "[m]ajor multinationals have not
understood that the whole value system of dealing with developing
countries is changing radically and rapidly .... The colonial
mind-set of 'bribery-as-usual' is coming under greater risk for
256 Doing Business in Nigeria, Bus. AM., Nov. 1995, at 26. The report identified
several different types of schemes that have been used to victimize foreigners. The most
prevalent is the money transfer and government contracts scam, in which Nigerians
solicit foreigners for bank account numbers, company stationery, and other bank
information in exchange for money or contracts from the Nigerian government. See id.
Variations on this scam involve false wills, charities, real estate, or fraudulent orders for
U.S. products. See id.
257 Ettorre, supra note 8, at 20. Another expert contends that "[m]ore countries are
evolving in a democrative way, and there is less and less tolerance by the local political
process itself of corruption." Marianne Lavelle, Nations Try to Match U.S. on Biz Bribe
Law, NAT. L.J., Jan. 20, 1997, at B2.
258 See Stevie Cameron, Dreaming of a World Without Corruption, MACLEAN'S,
Apr. 8, 1996, at 36.
259 Transparency International is a not-for-profit, non-governmental organization
devoted to combating corruption in international business. See
<http://www.transparency.de/index.html>.
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bribers.""26
B. The Political Issue
1. Costs to Governments and Business Officials
Nations in the "First World" are also beginning to recognize
the political costs of corruption to their countries. Old ways are
changing."' Recently in Europe, revelations of corruption have
led to ministerial resignations and criminal prosecutions.262
Sixteen former French ministers and the heads of several
household names in French industry-Renault, Paribas and
Alcatel among them--have been prosecuted.263 Six were convicted
of various corrupt activities and payments. 64 Italy's troubles are
also well documented.2 65  The suicides of officials, revelations of
Mafia ties,266 and the spectacle of Silvio Berlusconi being tried for
bribery267 have revealed the price that nations pay for a stagnant
260 Ettorre, supra note 8, at 20 (quoting statement of Frank Vogl, Vice-President of
Transparency International).
261 See Naim & Gall, supra note 51, at 1.
262 See id
263 See id. Investigations by aggressive magistrates have brought to light collusion
between political leaders and business executives. See id. In addition to the heads of
Renault, Paribas, and Alcatel, officials indicted chief executives at Compagnie Generale
des Eaux and Groupe Bouyjues. See id. Of the sixteen, six were convicted of and
sentenced on bribery and kickback charges. See id.
264 See id.
265 See Italy: Mess Continues, ECONOMIST, Jan. 20, 1996, at 49; John Tagliabue,
Some Plea Deals in Trial of Italy's Fashion Elite, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1996, at 31;
Designer Armani fined $87,000 Over Tax Bribes, TORONTO STAR, May 11, 1996, at
Al5; Robert Graham & John Simkins, Berlusconi Goes on Trial for Corruption, FIN.
TIMES, Jan. 17, 1996, at 2; David Henderson, Berlusconi at Bay, NEW STATESMAN &
SOCIETY, Dec. 1, 1995, at 24; Ray Moseley, Italy's Revolution Won't Be Built in One
Day, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 28, 1995, at 16; Daniel Williams, Berlusconi Ordered Tried for
Corruption, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 1995, at A27.
266 See Naim & Gall, supra note 51, at 1. Giulio Andreotti, a minister in 30 Italian
governments since the end of World War I, and Italian Prime Minister seven times, is
on trial for ties to the Mafia. See id.; see also Tom Mueller, Cosa Nostra, NEW
REPUBLIC, Apr. 15, 1996, at 17.
267 See Daniel Williams, supra note 265, at A27. According to charges, Fininvest,
Berlusconi's media conglomerate, paid approximately $230,000 in bribes between 1989
and 1991 to Italian tax auditors. See id. Berlusconi has denied knowing of the bribes.
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and corrupt public service, and a laissez faire attitude towards
bribery.2 68  Large-scale political scandals worldwide-from the
jailing of the former president of South Korea 69 to the difficulties
of President Samper in Colombia27 -leave little doubt that the
world will no longer tolerate "bribery as usual."
2. Political Unrest
Corruption can also do more than merely embarrass
governments or CEOs. Bribery can lead to serious political unrest,
and has played a role in the collapse of governments in Japan,
Italy, and Holland.27" ' The consequences of years of corruption in
India continue as 65 politicians representing all major parties are
being investigated for over $18 million in bribes.272
Financial markets despise political unrest and reward political
stability. Accordingly, as former World Bank President Robert
McNamara has pointed out, the climate of world opinion today is
more conducive to addressing bribery seriously than at any time in
the past 40 years.2 73 "[E]merging business and government classes
around the world are gradually adopting a new attitude. These
educated people-many seeking democratization in their home
countries-are coming to regard bribery as ultimately ruinous to
See id.
268 See id.
269 Former South Korean President Roh Tae Woo was convicted of receiving over
$300 million in bribes from 35 business groups during his five years as President. See
Naim & Gall, supra note 51, at 1.
270 Colombian President Ernesto Samper has been "pressured to resign amid
disclosure that he knowingly received millions of dollars in campaign contributions
from the Cali drug syndicate." Id.
271 See Pines, supra note 26, at 204. Part of the impetus for the creation of the
FCPA was to prevent payments which would destabilize foreign policy relationships
between the United States and foreign nations. INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS, supra note 9, at 313. Ironically, Congressional investigations prior to
passage of the FCPA by the Senate Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations
"threatened foreign relations... [and caused] considerable embarrassment and
withdrawal or removal from office... of national leaders." Id. Prime Minister Tanaka
of Japan resigned in disgrace, while Prince Bernard of Holland was publicly humiliated
by disclosure that he had received bribes. See id. For discussion of Italy's political
scandals, see supra notes 265-68 and accompanying text.
272 See India: A System Shakes, ECONOMIST, March 23, 1996, at 35.
273 See Ettorre, supra note 8, at 20.
1997] 433
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
their economies., 274
C. The Economic Issue
Corruption distorts markets because it sets prices not through
supply and demand, but through self-serving, inefficient
preferences. 275  The efficient enterprise is often punished; the
corrupt enterprise prospers. One research center estimates that
corruption has inflated Italy's total outstanding government debt
by as much as 15 percent, or about $200 billion.276 According to
Hong Kong's Independent Commission Against Corruption,
outright bribes as well as gifts or payments to establish guanxi
("connections") average 3 to 5 percent of operating costs, or $3
billion to $5 billion a year.2" A Chinese government internal
report reported in the Hong Kong press in 1993, claims that over
the decade of the 1980s, Chinese state assets fell by more than $50
billion, primarily because corrupt officials had deliberately
undervalued them in trading them off to foreigners.278 Further, a
1992 Russian study found that when food vendors were protected
from extortion and mob pressure, prices to shoppers fell 15 to 20
percent.279 There are less tangible consequences as well. "The real
cost of corruption lies in the demoralization, cynicism, and
enervation of entrepreneurial activity throughout the Third
World.
,211
274 Id.
275 See Elaine Sternberg, Relativism Rejected: The Possibility of Transnational
Business Ethics, in EMERGING GLOBAL BUSINESS ETHICS 148 (W. Michael Hoffman et al.
eds., 1994). For an excellent summary of the relationship between market inefficiency
and corruption (bribery in particular) see TI SOURCEBOOK, supra note 243, ch. 2.
276 See Karen Pennar et al., The Destructive Cost of Greasing Palms, Bus. WK.,
Dec. 6, 1993, at 133.
277 See id.
278 See Gregory Miles, Crime, Corruption, and Multinational Business, INT'L Bus.,
July 1995, at 34-35.
279 See Pennar et al., supra note 276, at 133.
280 Id. (quoting statement of Robert Klitgaard).
Graft and bribery in developing countries do not simply line the pockets of a
few officials, they butcher the entire economy .... Corruption produces
negligent, cynical government and inept officials who owe their jobs to
nepotism and patronage. It destroys the people's trust in their government,
breeds mutual distrust among citizens, subverts the rule of law and undermines
434 [Vol. 22
ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
Nor are the costs contained to particular nations. The global
economy as a whole suffers.28" ' The European Union Court of
Auditors reported last year that member states have wasted $1.2
billion on fraudulent infrastructure projects.2 The Hallcrest
Report, an analysis of corruption in international business,
estimates that the cost of economic crime runs between $100
billion and $150 billion annually. 3
D. The Consequences
These moral, political, and economic costs of corruption can
no longer be ignored. All over the world governments are
cracking down. Malaysia, for example, recently banned the award
of any government contracts to British firms,2 as a result of an
alleged $50,000 bribe paid by George Wimpey International to
secure a contract."5 This relatively small bribe now threatens to
undermine diplomatic relations between these two venerable
trading partners. 6
Singapore recently banned five multinational corporations-
BICC of Britain, Siemens of Germany, Pirelli of Italy, as well as
Tomen and Marubeni, both of Japan--from bidding for local
power contracts due to their involvement in a bribery scandal. 7
This followed a 14 year jail sentence meted out to the Deputy
Chief of the Public Utilities Board of Singapore for his
involvement.8 In Ecuador, five firms bidding on a $160 million
construction contract were required to sign a no-bribery
agreement. 9 In Argentina, government officials, in conjunction
with Transparency International, are taking steps to clean up
the work ethic.
Hearings on Int'l Crime, supra note 3.
281 See Miles, supra note 278, at 34-35.
282 See id.
283 See id.
284 See Murphy, supra note 144, at 391.
285 See id. at 392.
286 See id. at 391.
287 See Taylor, supra at note 294, at 4.
288 See id.
289 See Cameron, supra note 258, at 36.
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hospital contracting practices."' Nations are learning that the price
of bribery and other forms of corruption within their borders is too
high. Their response indicates that, "[t]he day is coming when
bribery as a way of greasing the wheels of business will be a
,,291
memory ..
E. The Results: Multinational Efforts to Control Corruption
1. "Pre-Revolution Attempts
In addition to national and non-governmental endeavors,
recent years have seen a proliferation of international initiatives.2 92
While multilateral efforts to control corruption have gained new
vitality and credibility in recent years, earlier efforts were not so
well received. One of the first attempts at a multilateral approach
was a 1976 United Nations General Assembly resolution
condemning all corrupt practices in business, including bribery.2 93
The resolution, however, was non-binding and the initiative
failed.2 94 An ad hoc Intergovernmental Working Group on Corrupt
Practices of the U.N. Economic and Social Council295 issued a draft
agreement2 96 in 1979, condemning illicit payments and requiring
all signatories to prohibit bribes to foreign officials, including
290 See id.
291 Ettorre, supra note 8, at 20.
292 See infra notes 304-33 and accompanying text.
293 G.A. Res. 3514, U.N. G.A.O.R., 13th Sess., Supp. No. 34, at 69, U.N. Doc.
A/10034 (1976), reprinted in 15 I.LM. 180 (1976). The resolution was adopted without
a vote on December 15, 1975. See id. The resolution, "condemn[ed] all corrupt
practices, including bribery, by transnational and other corporations". and called upon
nations to investigate and prosecute those involved in corrupt payments. Id. .(emphasis
in original).
294 The U.N. Resolution of 1975 was the first in a series of "unsuccessful efforts
within the UN to control real and perceived evils of multinationals operating in third
world and nonmarket economies." INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, supra note
9, at 336.
295 See Economic & Social Council Resolution 2041 (LXI) of August 5, 1976,
establishing ad hoc intergovernmental working group on the problem of corrupt
practices, reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 1222 (1976).
296 U.N. Economic & Social Council, International-Agreement on Illicit Payments,
U.N. Doc. E/104/1979, May 25, 1979, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1025 (1979).
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"grease" payments29 7 exempted under the FCPA.29  No conference
was ever convened to formalize the draft, however, and it was
never signed by any nation.299
The OECD guidelines of 1976... called upon member nations
to shun illicit payments, but again, the code was voluntary, with no
enforcement mechanisms."' The International Chamber of
Commerce adopted rules the following year to combat corruption
and bribery,3"2  and a panel was established to oversee
297 Grease payments are direct payments to government officials to help establish,
continue, maximize the profitability of, or minimize government interference in business
ventures in a given jurisdiction.
298 See American Bar Association, ABA Section of International Law & Practice
Reports to the House of Delegates, adopted Feb. 1995, reprinted in INT'L L., Spring
1996, at 194 [hereinafter ABA Report].
299 Murphy, supra note 144, at 387. See Interim Report to Congress:
Implementation of Section 5003(d) of the Trade Act of 1988, Aug. 25, 1995. Attempts
by Third World Nations to couple the agreement with the Code of Conduct for
Transnational Corporations (which was being worked on contemporaneously) left the
Working Group draft stillborn. See Murphy, supra note 144, at 387.
The last proposed text in 1988 included provision 21, comprising two brief
paragraphs which state that transnational corporations should not make bribes
and should maintain accounting records of payments to officials. Typical of the
efforts of the UN... no suggestion was included that foreign officials should
not request and accept bribes.
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, supra note 9, at 336.
300 OECD, Regulation of Foreign Investment, OECD/GD(92)16, available in
LEXIS, Intlaw Library, I Bdiel File, .at 563 (1976). The original OECD Investment
Guidelines promulgated in 1976 consisted of five documents: an umbrella declaration
and four annexed instruments. See Daniel B. McGraw, Introduction to the OECD
Regulation of Foreign Investment, (Nov. 1989), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, 1
Bdiel File, at 559. Following periodic reviews in 1979 and 1984, five documents are
now annexed to the declaration: the Guidelines; a section on Conflicting Requirements
Added in 1984; a Second Revised Decision on intergovernmental consultation and
conflicting requirements; a Second Revised Decision on national treatment; and a
Second Revised Decision on investment incentives and disincentives. See id.
301 See ABA Report, supra note 298, at 195. The Guidelines suggested that
corporations should neither offer nor accept bribes. See INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS, supra note 9, at 335: All OECD nations have endorsed the Guidelines.
See id.
302 International Chamber of Commerce, Commission on Ethical Practices
Recommendations to Combat Extortion and Bribery in Business Transactions, reprinted
in 17 I.L.M. 417 (1978).
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implementation.3 3 While the time was not yet ripe for such
measures, that has since changed.
2. Post-Cold War Efforts
The end of the Cold War and the increasing importance of
economic issues in international affairs has focused new global
attention on the issue of corruption.
a. OECD Recommendations
In May 1994, the 26 nations of the OECD issued their
Recommendation on Bribery in International Business
Transactions,304 the first multilateral consensus against overseas
bribery of foreign officials.3"5 The OECD concluded that if nations
only enforced legislation that already existed, international
corruption would be a thing of the past.30 6 The OECD Council has
also recently recommended formal elimination of the tax
deductibility of bribes in international business.3 7 Unfortunately,
303 See ABA Report, supra note 298, at 195.
304 OECD, Council Recommendation on Bribery in International Business
Transactions, May 27, 1994, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1389 (1994) [hereinafter Council
Recommendation on Bribery].
305 See ABA Report, supra note 298, at 195. The OECD Recommendation can be
found at <http://transparency.de/sourcebook/Part_C/cvL/14.html>.
306 See Council Recommendation on Bribery, supra note 304. The UNESCO Ad
Hoc Committee also noted that
although national laws exist in most countries with respect to corrupt practices,
they are not always effective against illicit payments in international
commercial transactions because of the transnational .... element of the
offense and its international implications. The impediments to effective
national action are many and varied. Effective enforcement at the national level
may be impeded by conflicts of jurisdiction, the inadequacy of information
available in any one State and conflicting governmental policies towards
enterprises and their activities.
Gevurtz, supra note 28, at 386 n.4.
307 See Larry Elliott, France & US Trade Blows Over Business of Bribes,
GUARDIAN, Apr. 13, 1996, at 2. The Recommendation on the Tax Deductibility of
Bribes to Foreign Government Officials
recommends that those Member States which do not disallow the deductibility
of bribes to foreign public officials re-examine such treatment with the
intention of denying this deductibility. Such action may be facilitated by the
trend to treat bribes to foreign officials as illegal... [and] instructs the
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over half of the 26 OECD members still permit corporations to
write off on tax returns bribes paid to foreign officials.3 °8
b. U.N. Efforts
Recent U.N. projects include the adoption of a Model Law on
Procurement of Goods and Construction in July of 1993 by the
Commission on International Trade Law. °9 A parallel Model Law
on Services was adopted in July 1994.0 Both contained anti-
bribery provisions.3"
c. European Efforts
Although the nations of Europe, with the arguable exception of
Sweden,"' have been slow to enact anti-bribery legislation along
the lines of the FCPA,313 some encouraging measures have recently
Committee on Fiscal Affairs, in cooperation with the Committee on
International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, to monitor the
implementation of this Recommendation, to promote the Recommendation in
the context of contacts with non-Member countries and to report to the Council
as appropriate.
Anti-Corruption Review, supra note 139, at 11-12.
308 See Hearings on Int'l Crime, supra note 3.
309 UNCITRAL, Model Law on Procurement of Goods and Construction, reprinted
in 33 I.L.M. 445 (1994).
310 UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of Goods, Construction, and Services,
art. 15 (1994) <http://itl.irv.uit.no/trade.law/documents/procurement/un_model_law/txt/
uncitral.model.law.procurement.94.complete.html#N>. The Model Law prescribes that
a procuring entity shall reject a tender, proposal, offer or quotation if the
supplier or contractor that submits it offers, gives or agrees to give, directly or
indirectly, to any current or former officer or employee of the procuring entity
or other governmental authority a gratuity in any form, an offer of employment
or any other thing of service or value, on an inducement with respect to any act
or decision of, or procedure followed by, the procuring entity in connection
with the procurement proceedings.
Id.; see also G.A. Res. 49/54, Dec. 9, 1994.
311 See Anti-Corruption Review, supra note 139, at 11-12. "These model
laws... are offered as advisory legislation to countries establishing procurement
regulations." ABA Report, supra note 298, at 197.
312 See id. For a discussion of applicable Swedish law see ZARIN, supra note 9, at
1-3 n.8.
313 INTERNATIONAL BuSINESS TRANSACTIONS, supra note 9, at 335. For example,
France's export insurance program (Compagnie Francaise d'Assurance pour le
Commerce Exterieur, or COFACE) covers foreign bribery ("commissions") as a part of
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been put forth at the supra-national level. In June of 1994, the
Justice Ministers from the Council of Europe adopted an anti-
corruption program calling for research projects, training
programs, and other educational programs aimed at curtailment of
corrupt practices.3 4 In June of 1995, the European Parliament
authorized the Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs to
draw up a report on corruption in Europe. 315  Thereafter, the
Parliament called upon EU member states to repeal tax deductions
and other indirect legislation that encourage or support illicit
payments. 316 The Resolution stated, in part, "combating corruption
nationally and internationally concerns all Member States and that
the agreements concluded between the Member States on this
subject are inadequate [and] that legal provisions and stiffer
penalties for crimes of corruption are not enough on their own. 3 7
d. Organization of American States Efforts
Since the end of the Cold War, the Organization of American
States (OAS) has taken several public stands against corruption.318
On June 1, 1994, the General Assembly of the OAS adopted a
resolution concerning international trade that stated, "corrupt
practices are capable of frustrating the process of overall
development, generating the diversion of resources necessary to
the improvement of the economic and social conditions of the
people. ,,3.9 Thereafter, on June 9, 1995, the General Assembly
of the Organization of American States adopted a resolution which
called for a working group to look into the links between honesty
and civic ethics. 30  An Inter-American Convention Against
Corruption negotiated by OAS member states was adopted and
opened for signature on March 29, 1996 in Caracas,32' and was
export risk. See id.
314 See ABA Report, supra note 298, at 197.
315 See Anti-Corruption Review, supra note 139, at 9-10.
316 See id.
317 Id. at 9.
318 See ABA Report, supra note 298, at 197.
319 Id.
320 See Anti-Corruption Review, supra note 139, at 9.
321 See id. at 13. As one U.S. Senator characterized the Convention,
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later signed by 21 nations.322 The Convention calls for institutional
-development to fight corruption, including legal assistance and
technical cooperation.3 23 Further mechanisms were developed for
cooperation in extradition; seizure of assets, and mutual legal aid
where corruption affects parties to the Convention.324
e. World Trade Organization Measures
Prior to the end of the Cold War, the members of the General
Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) took no interest in
dealing with international corruption.3 25  The Uruguay Round of
GATT did, however establish a Government Procurement Code,326
which the United States signed on April 15, 1995.327 The World
Trade Organization (WTO), established by the Uruguay Round,
adopted a code that covers procurement of goods and services,
including construction, by central government entities, subcentral
government entities, and other quasi-governmental bodies.3 28 The
new WTO Code "substantially increases the scope and value of
coverage compared to the existing GATT Procurement Code, as
well as improves its procedural disciplines, particularly on new
[S]ome might see this document [as unenforceable], but what it does do is
begin the process, in Latin America, as has been done in the rest of the world,
to commit the parties-in theory, at least--to the notion that bribery is a
destructive force in democratic development and international business.
142 CONG. REc. S4833 (May 8, 1996) (statement of Senator Russell Feingold). The
response of the OAS stands in stark contrast to the response by ASEAN nations. See id.
When United States Trade Representative Jeffrey Lang raised the issue, he was criticized
by Malaysian and Indonesian officials. See id.
322 See Anti-Corruption Review, supra note 139, at 13.
323 See id.
324 See id.
325 See INTERNATIONAL BusIEss TRANSACTIONS, supra note 9, at 335. The
Uruguay Round did not result in any express anti-bribery provisions either. See id.
326 Agreement on Government Procurement, General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, Jan. 1, 1981, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) (1980) (entered into force Jan. 1,
1981). This Agreement was adopted as part of the Final Act Embodying the Results of
the Uruguay Round of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, opened for signature Apr.
15, 1994, reprinted in GATT Secretariat, The Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations at 438, GATT Sales No. 1994-4 (1994).
327 See Anti-Corruption Review, supra note 139, at 12.
328 See id.
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provisions on bid challenges." '329 Thus far only the EU, the U.S.,
Japan, Canada, Norway, Israel, and South Korea have adopted the
Code.33
The United States continues to press the WTO on the subject.
Louis Freeh, Director of the FBI, and Kenneth Kendall, Secretary-
General of Interpol, spoke of the need to make corrupt practices a
new action item at the first biannual summit meeting last
December in Singapore.33" ' Indeed, the Ministerial Declaration
issued December 13, 1996, called for a working group to study
transparency in government procurement practices and, based on
the results, to develop elements for inclusion in a future agreement
on transparency.332 The WTO remains a "crucial international
arena for effecting reforms among the countries which demand
bribes....
V. The Response of the Private Sector
A. Learning the Lesson--Corruption is Bad for Business
Ironic as it may seem, the private sector is beginning to
outpace governmental efforts in the fight against international
business corruption. Businesses increasingly appreciate that
compliance with the law is not only legally required, but can be
financially profitable. Multinational corporations are also learning
that corporate codes of conduct which go beyond mere compliance
with legal standards and norms are increasingly essential in
sustaining long-term international competitiveness. At the most
cynical level, international companies are learning the hard lesson
that the so-called "benefits" of corruption are simply not worth the
risk. The "wages of sin" can indeed be death-both literally and
figuratively-in the brave new world economy, as the following
329 Id.
330 See id. at 13. The WTO Procurement Code entered into force on January 1,
1996. See id.
331 See John Zarocostas, WTO Urged to Take on Battle Against Corruption, J.
CoM., Feb. 6, 1996, at IA.
332 See WTO, Singapore Ministerial Declaration, Dec. 13, 1996, art. 21
<http:www.wto96.org/wto-dec.html>.
333 Hearings on Int'l Crime, supra note 3.
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examples show.
1. Dassault Aviation
Consider the recent bribery charges involving Dassault
Aviation.33 4 A far-reaching scandal involving bribery of Belgian
Socialist Party members to secure helicopter contracts has put
Dassault and Agusta SpA in the world-wide spotlight.35
Investigations have resulted in the resignation of Willy Claes as
Secretary General of NATO,336 Guy Coeme, who was the defense
minister at the time of the contracts, " 7 the suicide of Belgium's
former Air Force Chief of Staff,33 and numerous indictments.339
The CEO of Dassault cannot leave France without risking arrest
by Interpol, while the former CEO of Agusta SpA, Raffaele Teti,
was extradited to Belgium from Brazil to stand trial.3'4 The
scandal has severely hampered Dassault's efforts to sell its new
Rafale fighter bomber abroad, and French President Jacques
Chirac is now pressuring Dassault to merge with Aerospatial,
France's biggest aerospace company.3 1 Mr. Dassault, hiding in
France, is poorly positioned to resist. In sum, bribes paid to secure
a $2 10 million dollar contract have resulted in at least one suicide,
a public relations disaster, litigation costs, possible jail terms for
several CEOs, and, in the case of Dassault, quite possibly the end
of this old and venerable family enterprise.
2. The Law of Unforeseeable Consequences
The Dassault disaster illustrates another compelling force that
334 See Martin DuBois & Mark M. Nelson, Belgium Pursues Corruption Probe
Involving Dassault, WALL ST. J., May 13, 1996, at A16.
335 See id.
336 See Vote in Belgium's Parliament sends NATO Chief to Court, BALTIMORE SUN,
Oct. 20, 1995, at 16A. Prosecutors allege Claes knew the Socialist Party, of which he
was a high minister, received a $1.7 million bribe from Agusta SpA in order to secure a
$330 million contract. See id.
331 See Belgium Sentenced, INDEP., Apr. 6, 1996, at 12.
338 See DuBois & Nelson, supra note 334, at A16.
339 See id.
340 See id.
341 See id.
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international businessmen must respect: the "law of unforeseeable
consequences." Experience in China, for example, shows that
when a company first agrees to .pay bribes, it is immediately
tainted with a reputation for corruption that is virtually impossible
342to shake. Virtue, once lost, is rarely ever regained. One
payment quickly becomes two, then four, and so on. The smell of
corruption attracts other would-be bribees like flies, all of whom
exert their leverage by threatening to report previous
transgressions. A company that behaves and plays by the rules
may lose a deal or two to less scrupulous competitors, particularly
in the short-term. However, it will likely not suffer the fate of
Dassault, or of Kirkpatrick, or of others who gambled, failed, and
have lost it all.
B. Private Initiatives-Beyond Compliance
Multinational corporations know that standards and
expectations are rising, and many are re-inventing their corporate
cultures. Companies will not tolerate corruption simply because it
is bad for business and makes the firm less competitive in a world
of ever-shrinking margins. U.S. companies are clearly taking the
lead in this effort.343 Many farsighted multinationals have adopted
corporate codes that shadow FCPA provisions, and in many
instances go beyond them.34 A 1987 survey found that 94.7% of
corporate respondents had adopted a written code of conduct that
included anti-bribery provisions, and of these 83.3% specifically
discussed FCPA compliance.345 Other corporations have made
integrity their calling card. For example, during Colgate-
Palmolive's recent investment in Guangdong province, corporate
342 See Ettorre, supra note 8 ("Once a company has gotten business via illegal
payments, it is difficult to shed the image of corruption. Expectations have been
created, and it is almost impossible for a company to get out from under a corrupt
reputation.").
313 See, e.g., Gabriella Stem and Joann S. Lublin, New GM Rules Curb Wining &
Dining, WALL ST. J., June 5, 1996, at BI (discussing GM's implementation of a new
anti-bribery policy considered "among the toughest in corporate America").
Additionally, Wal-Mart bars any employee accepting anything of monetary value, and
competitor K-Mart recently revised its ethics code to do the same. See id.
344 See id.
345 See Pines, supra note 26, at 211.
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officials heavily publicized the company's "no-bribery" policy,
which enabled them to open a $20 million dollar factory without
any illicit payments or shady deals.34
Promoting business integrity can even be a money-making
eiterprise. Swiss Procurement Corporation (SWIPCO) is one of a
number of new international agencies providing "credibility"
services to governments as primary purchasing agents.347 Many
Latin American nations, in their attempts to move away from their
traditional corrupt practices, have purchased. SWIPCO's
services.348
General Motors instituted some of the toughest guidelines in
the world recently in response to accusations of kickbacks at GM's
Adam Opel AG unit in Europe.349 GM employees may only accept
token gifts of nominal value such as lucite cubes or baseball
caps.35° Football tickets, lavish post-closing dinners, and the like
are now explicitly forbidden.' General Electric, Enron, and other
large multinationals have instituted rigorous self-policing policies
to ensure their employees not only obey the law, but go beyond
compliance. 2 These and other successful businesses view tight
ethical codes as creating and sustaining a competitive advantage
over their competitors.
The essential link between honesty and efficiency is not a new
concept, having been promoted years ago by such prominent
thinkers as Friedreich Hayek and Milton Friedman.353 Their
theoretical approach has seen practical expression in recent years
in the form of the worldwide Total Quality Management (TQM)
346 See id.
347 Michael Skol, Out From Under the Table, Bus. MEX., Feb. 1996.
348 See id.
349 See Stem & Lublin, supra note 343, at BI.
350 See id.
351 See id.
352 See Miles, supra note 278, at 35.
313 See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, FREE To CHOOSE (1980) (discussing how free
markets--and the virtues of thrift, honesty, and independence associated therewith-are
superior to state sponsored or centrally planned models of organization). Regarding
Hayek see Brian Lee Crowley, Knowledge: The Scarcest Resource, CAN. Bus. REV.,
Dec. 22, 1992, at 14.
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movement. 4 The global trend towards honesty and transparency
is a natural outgrowth of industry's preoccupation with product
quality, customer focus, and quality management. It is
extraordinarily difficult for a global enterprise to expect and
enforce "zero defect" quality standards in an corporate atmosphere
of moral and ethical hypocrisy. As a result, the worldwide TQM
phenomenon, originally a strategy to establish or regain industrial
competitiveness, has also resulted in a rising standard of global
business conduct.
355
VI. Conclusion
Hayek and Friedman teach that corporations that behave
ethically perform efficiently. The Greek word for "ethical virtue,"
ethike, was derived from the Greek word for "habit," ethos.
5 6
"Our moral dispositions," Aristotle wrote, "are formed as a result
of [our] corresponding activities. 357  Corruption-in a word-
corrupts. Or, as Edmund Burke observed two centuries ago,
"[C]riminal means once tolerated are soon preferred. They
present a shorter cut to the object than through the highway of the
moral virtues."5 8
"Moral virtues" sounds somewhat antiquated to our more
cynical modem ears; and Burke's ideas at first do not seem
354 Total Quality Management (TQM) was developed by W. Edward Deming just
after the Second World War. See Ron Carter, Honda Conference to Toast Management
Style, COLUMBUS DIsp., Nov. 25, 1996, at 3. TQM was adopted by many Japanese
corporations, such as Honda, in the 1950s. See id. Generally, the philosophy of TQM is
"to give rank-and-file employees more power and encourage them to participate in
making decisions." Id. TQM gained favor in American business circles in the 1980s.
For a general discussion of Deming's theory and TQM, see ANDREA GABOR, THE MAN
WHO DISCOVERED QUALITY: How W. EDWARDS DEMING BROUGHT THE QUALITY
REVOLUTION TO AMERICA (1990).
355 See Lavelle, supra note 257, at B2. One commentator has noted that it has
"generally been recognized that it's very hard to run a competitive business attempting
to apply global management and performance standards if one of your units in a
particular country is effectively having to funnel cash into the hands of local suppliers."
Id.
356 See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST 36 (1995).
357 Id. (quoting ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS, BOOK II, at i.8).
358 EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 92 (1790)
(Liberal Arts Press 1955).
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appropriate to a hard-nosed discussion of FCPA compliance.
However, confidence in and understanding of the nexus between
ethical behavior and wealth creation-i.e., between markets and
morals-is gaining strength as never before. James Q. Wilson in
The Moral Sense reminds us that, "[c]ommercial life requires
transactions-buying, selling, lending, borrowing-that are made
easier by trust and a reputation for trustworthiness. To acquire
that useful reputation, fair dealing is necessary. . . .""' By the
same token, as Francis Fukuyama makes clear in his recent work
Trust, the prevalence of entrepreneurial spirit, and the success of a
nation's economy, exists in direct proportion to the level of trust
and sociability in its culture.36 As Fukuyama points out, "[i]f
people who have to work together in an enterprise trust one
another because they are all operating according to a common set
of ethical norms, doing business costs less." '361 People cannot trust
each other, however, in enterprises or nations that encourage or
condone corruption. For this reason, "the international wheels of
commerce are slowly-but inevitably--grinding away at the
practice of bribery. It makes sense then for companies and
managers to operate globally as though this change had already
occurred." '362 Today, perhaps as never before in the history of
world commerce, there is at least a fair chance that the force of the
invisible hand may well triumph over the culture of the greased
palm.
359 JAMES Q. WILSON, THE MORAL SENSE 210 (1993).
360 See FUKUYAMA, supra note 356, at 6-7.
361 Id. at 27. "Such a society will be better able to innovate organizationally, since
the high degree of trust will permit a wide variety of social relationships to emerge." Id.
Due to the high degree of trust in their cultures, "highly sociable Americans pioneered
the development of the modem corporation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, just as the Japanese have explored the possibilities of network organizations in
the twentieth." Id.
362 Ettore, supra note 8.
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